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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bipartisan Budget Bill of 2013 contains an obscure
1
provision—Section 203 —titled Restriction on Access to the Death
2
Master File, which was promoted as a safeguard against identity
3
theft. The legislation, which blocks access for a number of years to
vital records that have been publically available for decades, does
little to achieve its goal. It does, however, threaten to undermine
trust in the U.S. Congress because of the process through which it
was enacted. While identity theft is a serious problem, it is curious
why such a harsh measure as the enactment of Section 203 was
taken because only a small portion of it is traceable to the Death
4
Master File (DMF). Especially given that the 113th Congress was

1. Act of Dec. 26, 2013, Pub. L. No.113-67, 127 Stat. 1165, 1177 (2013)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1306c (2014)). Author’s references to Section 203 will be
cited to the enacted code section. Restriction on Access to the Death Master File,
42 U.S.C. § 1306 (2014).
2. Resolution Making Continuing Appropriations, H.R.J. Res. 59, 113th
Cong. (2013 enacted). Most provisions were effective on March 26, 2014.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 153–69 (discussing the motivating
factors, including instances of identity theft, that prompted the 113th Congress to
pass Section 203).
4. See infra Section II.B.2. Most IRS fraud cases have little connection with
the DMF. In one example, in January 2014, a Floridian was sentenced for buying
eight hundred identities from a hospital and then requesting $11,000,000 in
fraudulent tax refunds. Curt Anderson, Prosecutor: Florida Tops U.S. in Identity Theft,
Tax Fraud, NAPLES DAILY NEWS LEDGER, http://www.theledger.com/article
/20140115 /news/140119423?p=1&tc=pg (Jan. 15, 2014). Identity theft costs up to
$100,000,000 a year. See Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity
Fraud in the Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 661, 663 (1999) (citing Mark Grossman, The Other You:
The Misery of Identity Theft, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 4, 1998, at B1). During
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5

infamous for its inaction, one can only wonder whether, trying to
project competence, the 113th Congress ignored legitimate efforts
to address identity theft by blaming tax return fraud not on the
6
thieves but on the DMF. The prevention of public access to the
7
DMF, long a legitimate source of research, is a hardship to many.

the 1990s, these losses doubled and cases reported to the Social Security
Administration (SSA) tripled. Id. Credit reporting firms indicated that fraud
reports jumped from fewer than twelve thousand in 1992 to over fifty thousand by
1998. Kathy M. Kristof, New Law to Assist Victims in Fight against Identity Fraud, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/oct/31/business/fi37782; see Saunders & Zucker, supra at 4; see also Kristen M. Blankley, Note, Are
Public Records Too Public? Why Personally Identifying Information Should be Removed from
Both Online and Print Versions of Court Documents, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 413, 418 n.18
(2004); Stephanie Byers, Note, The Internet: Privacy Lost, Identities Stolen, 40
BRANDEIS L.J. 141, 148–62 (2001) (comparing federal, state, and multinational
solutions). The Death Master File (DMF) was created as a result of a 1980 consent
judgment in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case, Perholz v. Ross, which
required that deceased persons’ identifying information, including social security
numbers (SSNs), be made public. See Strengthen the Integrity and Protection of the
Social Security Number: Hearing on Social Security’s Death Records before Subcomm. on Soc.
Sec. & Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 3 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing on
Social Security’s Death Records], http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/testimony
/Death%20Master%20File%20Written%20Statement%20FINAL.pdf (statement
for the record by the Hon. Patrick P. O’Carrol, Jr.). Vital records relate to births,
marriages, deaths, diseases, etc. that are required to be kept by the government.
Vital Statistics, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Divorces are also
presumably included in this list.
5. See Ezra Klein & Evan Soltas, Wonkbook: Is This the Laziest Congress Ever?,
POST
(July
2,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
WASH.
/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/02/wonkbook-is-this-the-laziest-congress-ever/; see also
Derek Willis, A Do-Nothing Congress? Well, Pretty Close, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/upshot/a-do-nothing-congress-well-prettyclose.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0; Frank James, 5 Achievements of the 113th Congress
(So Far), NPR (Dec. 27, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics
/2013/12/27/256621840/five-achievements-of-the-113th-congress-s-first-year.
6. See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing how the IRS ignored sources of
identity theft). DMF theft was involved in the 2013 case of Tania Henderson, who
was sentenced to 144 months in prison and $835,883 restitution, for theft of
identity and government funds in stealing identities of more than four hundred
people, many deceased, filing returns under their names and SSNs. INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., IRS Criminal Investigation Combats Identity Theft Refund Fraud (2014),
https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Criminal-Investigation-Combats-IdentityTheft-Refund-Fraud. However, the IRS took no responsibility for issuing these
payments, even though it would have learned of the fraud had it compared the
SSNs with the DMF. Id.
7. The DMF has been publically accessible electronically since the 1960s.
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Undoubtedly, in these times, privacy is imperiled. Regrettably,
public confidence in the government’s appreciation for privacy was
shattered with Edward Snowden’s 2013 exposures (which still
8
continue) revealing the extent to which the government, through
the National Security Agency (NSA), has been spying on us for
9
10
years. This extralegal conduct extended to both private e-mails
11
and phone calls.
Leah McGrath Goodman, Returns of the Living Dead, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 18, 2013,
7:43 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2013/12/20/returns-living-dead-244944
.html.
8. In October 2014, the extent of mail monitoring since September 11,
2011 became evident. See Ron Nixon, Report Revels Wider Tracking of Mail in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/us-secretlymonitoring-mail-of-thousands.html. The report, available after a FOIA request by
the New York Times (NYT), exposed that “the surveillance program was used by a
county attorney and sheriff” in Arizona “to investigate a political opponent [of
notorious Maricopa County sheriff, Joe Arpaio] and to monitor privileged
communications between lawyers and their clients,” in violation of postal
regulations. Id.; see also CITIZENFOUR, (HBO Films 2014).
9. The “N.S.A. program was disclosed and then declassified . . . following
leaks by Edward J. Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor;” a review group
determined that “the bulk collection is illegal, rejecting the government’s Patriot
Act interpretation.” Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End to N.S.A.’s Bulk Data
Collection, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25
/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-data.html [hereinafter Savage, Mar. 24, 2014].
The program “was part of the secret surveillance program that President George
W. Bush . . . put in place after the . . . attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, outside of any legal
framework . . . . In 2006, . . . the Justice Department persuaded the surveillance
court to begin authorizing [it].” Id. Acknowledgement of government spying was
confirmed by President Obama’s order “to curtail government surveillance” by
increasing “limits on access to bulk telephone data” and implementing “privacy
safeguards for foreigners.” Peter Baker & Charlie Savage, Obama to Place Some
Restraints on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A1. In March 2014, the
Obama administration issued a plan to overhaul the National Security Agency’s
(NSA) bulk phone records program. See Savage, Mar. 24 2014, supra. The proposal
ended the NSA’s “systematic collection of data about Americans’ ‘calling habits,’”
requiring NSA to “obtain specific records only with” judicial permission. Id.; see
also Charles Savage, N.S.A. Program Gathers Data on a Third of Nation’s Calls, Officials
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2014, at A11; Charles Savage, Obama Says N.S.A. Curbs
Would Address Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2014, at A16.
10. Jill Kelley sued the government in 2014 for accessing her e-mail and
releasing her name in connection with a scandal causing General David Petraeus,
then CIA director, to resign. Jennifer Steinhauer, From Petraeus Scandal, an Apostle
for Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2014, at A1, A11.
11. See James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole Allows Warrantless
Search for US Citizens’ E-mails and Phone Calls, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2013),
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Even apart from Snowden’s dramatic exposures, privacy was
already in jeopardy. Loss of an expectation of privacy in Social
Security Numbers (SSNs), for instance, is so assumed that many
courts have long held that the tort standard of “reasonable
12
expectation of privacy” no longer applies to these numbers.
This article tells the story of the enactment of the bill
13
containing Section 203. It also provides context for Congress’s
widespread practice of inserting substantive provisions into
appropriations bills, and argues that this practice is inappropriate
14
and counterproductive. Enacted in haste, at the end of a lengthy
and historically contentious legislative session plagued by threats of
15
an unfunded government, Section 203 was slipped into a bill
about a wholly different topic—“keeping the government open and
16
functioning” —without input from key legislators or stakeholders.
Hence, its difficulties were foreseeable.
Part II of this piece offers background about the DMF and its
uses, early warnings regarding security problems, and sources of
identity theft other than the DMF. Part III uncovers the process of
enacting Section 203, the congressional opposition to it, and the
adverse consequences of Section 203’s enactment. The article
concludes that Section 203’s enactment, as accomplished by
bypassing congressional rules, was both misguided and a diversion

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantlesssearches-email-calls; see also Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Obama Calls for
Significant Changes in Collection of Phone Records of U.S. Citizens, WASH. POST (Jan. 17,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-speech-obama-to-call-forrestructuring-of-nsas-surveillance-program/2014/01/17/e9d5a8ba-7f6e-11e3-95c60a7aa80874bc_story.html.
12. Katharine Madison Burnett, Illegal Immigration, Social Security Numbers, and
the Federal Privacy Act: A Suggested Avenue of Litigation, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 503, 510
(2008).
13. See infra Section II.A.
14. See infra Section II.A and text accompanying notes 209–53.
15. See Tom Cohen, House GOP Launches Shutdown Battle by Voting to Defund
Obamacare, CNN (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/20
/politics/congress-spending-showdown/index.html.
16. See Lori Montgomery, Senate Passes Bipartisan Budget Agreement, WASH.
POST (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-topass-bipartisan-budget-agreement/2013/12/18/54fd3a1a-6807-11e3-a0b9249bbb34602c_story.html (“The agreement draws to a close nearly three years of
fighting over . . . budgets . . . that repeatedly risked shutting down the government
and actually did close parks, museums and federal offices . . . in October.”); see also
infra Part II.

9. Scharf (791-863) (Do Not Delete)

5/2/2016 9:52 PM

796

[Vol. 42:791

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

from correcting profound governmental failures involving longterm fraudulent use of personal information. This enactment
process threatens to exacerbate the public’s profound lack of
17
confidence in Congress —the only branch created to be
18
democratic —and to erode core democratic principles. Part VI
offers theories, based in both law and equity, that challenge the
current process to revive some confidence in government.
II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE DEATH MASTER FILE
A.

History, Purposes, Uses, and Abuses

The DMF, the commercial and publicly available version of
which is commonly known as the Social Security Death Index
19
(SSDI), is a computer database file created to prevent fraud and
20
theft, made widely available in 1980 by the Social Security
17. John Martinez, Rational Legislating, 34 STETSON L. REV. 547, 555 n.22
(2005) (citing WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 3–18 (9th ed. 1997) (discussing discontent
over Congress)); see KEEFE & OGUL at 7 (“[I]nstitutional arrangements in the
legislature obscure the public’s view of the decision-making process and . . . make
it difficult to fix responsibility for actions . . . .”). “[I]n seventeen Gallup surveys
between 1973 and 1995 . . . the confidence level [in Congress] averaged . . . 30
percent. In 1994, . . . [it] slipped to 18 percent . . . . By 1995, confidence was . . . 21
percent . . . . In 1994, ‘(e)ight out of ten voters’ surveyed believed ‘members care
more about keeping power than . . . the best interests of the nation, . . . more
about special interests . . . than . . . the average person . . . ,’ and that threequarters of voters believe Congressional candidates ‘make campaign promises they
have no intention of fulfilling;’ and ‘fewer than a third believe most members have
a high personal moral code.’” Id. at 15.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I; see also Democracy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (defining
democracy as, “a: government by the people; especially: rule of the majority . . . b: a
government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by
them directly or indirectly through a system of representation . . . .”).
19. I sometimes refer to the publicly available information in the DMF as
“Public DMF.”
20. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION (TIGTA),
Detection Has Improved; However, Identity Theft Continues to Result in Billions of Dollars
in Potentially Fraudulent Tax Refunds, No. 2013-40-122 n. 16 (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340122fr.html#_
[hereinafter TIGTA Report Sept. 20, 2013]. For overview, see Limited Access DMF
Overview and Usage, SOCIAL SECURITY DEATH MASTER FILE, www.ssdmf.com (follow
“About Us” hyperlink; then click on “Overview” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 2,
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Administration (SSA) after a consent decree in a Freedom of
21
Information Act (FOIA) case. The SSA provides the DMF to the
Department of Commerce’s (DOC) National Technical
Information Service (NTIS), which sells the data to public and
22
private organizations. The files contain information about deaths
23
24
that have been reported to the SSA since 1936. Until late 2011,
DMF data contained the deceased’s full name, SSN, dates of birth
and death, state, county, zip code of the last known address, and
25
zip code where lump sum death benefit payments were sent.
26
Other federal agencies use this information, as do states and
localities, life insurance and pension providers, genealogists,
scientists, and social scientists. Until President Obama signed the

2016); see also Claudia Hill, Death & Taxes & Identity Theft, FORBES at para. 4 (Aug.
1, 2011, 7:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/irswatch/2011/08/01/deathtaxes-identity-theft/#5f8f9963472c (“The DMF has been . . . one of the
government’s most effective weapons against financial fraud, since assuming the
identity of a dead person has . . . been a favorite ploy of criminals.”).
21. FOIA provides access to federal agency records. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2014). See
also National Taxpayer Advocate Annual Report to Congress, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
SERVICE (Dec. 31, 2012) [hereinafter National Taxpayer Advocate], http://www
.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/2012-Annual-Reportto-Congress-Executive-Summary.pdf .
22. See Hearing on Social Security’s Death Records, supra note 4, at 1. (statement
for the record by Honorable Patrick P. O’Carroll, Jr. before the 112th Congress).
23. Goodman, Returns of the Living Dead, supra note 7. Until Section 203, the
DMF was considered a public document under FOIA. Id.
24. In November 2011, citing a federal rule prohibiting it from disclosing
death information received through state contracts, the SSA quietly reduced the
Public DMF records it provided to NTIS by about 4.2 million to include only
name, SSN, birth and death dates. See Hearing on Social Security’s Death Records, supra
note 4, at 1. This resulted in a thirty-six percent reduction of deaths reported in
the DMF. Earl F. Glynn, Research Limitations with “New” Death Master File,
WATCHDOGLABS (Aug. 9, 2012, 3:43 AM), https://web.archive.org/web
/20140412224630/http://watchdoglabs.org/blog/2012/08/09/researchlimitations-with-new-death-master-file/. The SSA still provides NTIS information it
receives from funeral homes, hospitals, postal authorities, financial institutions,
families, etc.
25. Hearing Before the Ways and Means Soc. Sec. Subcomm., Comm. on Fin. Servs.
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 114th Cong. (2001), https://ssa.gov
/legislation/testimony_110801.html.
26. These agencies include the State Department of Education, the National
Institution for Occupational Safety and Health, the IRS, the Brooks Air Force
Base, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Commerce.
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bill that contained Section 203, the DMF was free, open to the
27
public, and updated regularly.
The DMF is useful to a wide variety of researchers, genealogists
28
29
included. While some characterize genealogy as a trivial hobby,
many disagree:
[R]esearching one’s family history often is more than
merely a hobby. It may be critically important in tracing
inherited medical diseases as well as in the reunification
of family members long thought lost or never known to
have existed. Records access does not simply satisfy
intellectual curiosity . . . . [I]t may save lives. . . . [A]ccess
to vital records not only is critical for genealogical
research, but actually prevents identity theft. . . . [S]ince
use of a death record proves that a person actually is
deceased, the decedent’s information could not be used
30
fraudulently by others.
Professional genealogists often use the DMF as a tool to assist
31
the work of courts and of agencies. Board certification allows
27. Brian Naylor, Tighter Access to “Death Master File” Has Researchers Worried,
NPR (Jan. 6, 2014, 5:37 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/01/06/260188571
/tighter-access-to-u-s-deaths-list-has-researchers-grim.
28. See generally Goodman, Returns of the Living Dead, supra note 7.
29. Tax Admin. Reform Discussion Draft: Hearing Before the Comm. of Fin., at 2
(2014), http://www.fgs.org/rpac/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/RPAC-Feedbackto-SFC-Discussion-Draft-20-Jan-2013-Final2.pdf [hereinafter Moss Testimony]
(statement of Frederick E. Moss, Member, Rec. Preservation & Access Comm.); see
also Jan Meisels Allen, Letter to Hearing before U.S. S. Fin. Comm., Subcomm. on Fiscal
Resp. and Econ. Growth, at 2 (2012), http://www.fgs.org/rpac/wp-content/uploads
/2012/04/iajgs-statement-for-the-record-senate-sub-cmte-on-fiscal-responsibilityfinal-2.pdf [hereinafter Allen Statement Mar. 2012] (“Millions of Americans are
interested in their family history; . . . 73% . . . believe it is important to pass along
their family’s lineage . . . .”); see Russell Bangerter, Researching Family History:
Genealogy is More Than Just a Hobby, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012, 5:00 AM),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865552024/Genealogy-is-more-than-just-ahobby.html?pg=all.
30. Jan Meisels Allen, Restriction of Access to Records is Increasing Threat to
Genealogical Research, 29 AVOTAYNU 3 (2013), http://www.iajgs.org/pramc
/2013FallPage03AllenPart1.rlm.pdf [hereinafter Allen, AVOTAYNU]. For medical
risk aggravation from delays tracking inheritable conditions, see MASS.
GENEALOGICAL COUNCIL, Framing a Discussion on Vital Records Access, 2, 13 (2009),
http://www.fgs.org/rpac/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/mgc_white_paper.pdf
(citing E-mail from Melinde Lutz Sanborn, Vice President of MGC, to Jan Alpert,
President of the National Genealogical Society (May 2, 2009) (on file with
author)).
31. Board for Certification of Genealogists, BOARD FOR CERTIFICATION OF
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courts to recognize genealogists as experts “in kinship
determination and identity. A significant number . . . work for
probate courts, lawyers, coroners, police departments, Native
American tribal councils, the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the
32
U.S. Department of Defense.”
Forensic genealogists determine issues of lineage and geneticsassociated diseases, repatriate stolen art, assist military
repatriations, prove Indian tribal membership for various benefits,
locate heirs in estate cases, determine real estate, oil, gas, and
mineral rights, as well as quiet title actions, resolve immigration
issues, prove claims in coroners’ and unclaimed kin cases, and assist
33
in adoption cases.
Other researchers also rely on the DMF. For example,
economists use it to research “the effects of government policies,
34
economic conditions, and other factors on mortality.” DMF-based
information impacts research that “generate[s] important
35
information for policymakers.” For example, projects such as
Health and Retirement Study, the Panel Study on Dynamics, and
the National Longitudinal Survey, use data from the DMF to
36
“identify decedents in a timely manner and at low cost.” This data
is also used by researchers who are studying “savings and wealth
accumulation, retirement, health care, disability, biomarkers, and
37
cognition in the U.S. population.” The DMF is also used to
“examine the links between early life circumstances such as birth
weight and longevity, and the intergenerational effects of parents

GENEALOGISTS, Bcgcertification.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
32. Barbara J. Mathews, Answers to Questions from the School of Government at the
University of North Carolina, BOARD FOR CERTIFICATION OF GENEALOGISTS, at 2 (Mar.
4,
2013),
http://bcgcertification.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2013/03
/BCGresponseUNCquestions4Mar2013.pdf
33. See Hearing before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm, on Soc. Sec.,
Written Comments on Provisions Relating to Social Security Administration’s Death Master
File, 112th Cong. 179 (2012), http://www .gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG112hhrg78179/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg78179.pdf [hereinafter Ryesky Statement Feb.
5, 2012] (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-13b(a)(6)(B)(i)) (statement of Kenneth. H.
Ryesky); see also Moss Testimony, supra note 29, at Exhibit A.
34. Jonathan S. Skinner, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Certification
Program for Access to the Death Master File (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOC-2014-0001-0078.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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38

socioeconomic status and their childrens [sic] longevity,” as
“[u]nderstanding . . . health and longevity in the elderly . . . is
essential for forecasting . . . Social Security, Medicare, and
39
Medicaid liabilities.” Additionally, the DMF allows researchers to
analyze how economic changes, as well as changes in health policy
40
and other programs, impact population health over time. Other
methods of data collection, such as smaller surveys and
41
“incomplete samples,” do not allow researchers this opportunity.
Another example are medical researchers, who refer to the
DMF to study the “federal assessments of hospital safety,” as well as
42
“efforts by the financial industry to spot consumer fraud,” and to
conduct studies such as the Nurses’ Health Study, a longitudinal
43
cancer study of two hundred thousand women.
The DMF also supports statistical work, such as that completed
by the Nationwide Professional Statisticians’ Association and the
Council of Professional Associations on Federal Statistics, which
represents over three hundred thousand people, all of whom “rely
on timely and accessible federal statistics to inform program
44
decisions or to conduct research and . . . program evaluation.”
Timely information on death is critical for program and policy
evaluation. Indeed, it is impossible to assess the mortality impacts
of various factors beyond health insurance, including education,
federal program enrollment, or healthcare quality, without access
45
to an updated DMF. Moreover, two influential longitudinal
surveys, the Health and Retirement Study and the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, both of which are used by social and health
46
scientists, rely on DMF data to confirm participants’ deaths.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Kevin Sack, Researchers Wring Hands as U.S. Clamps Down on Death Record
Access, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, at A17. The Centers for Disease Control maintains
a database, but it charges fees. Id.
43. Id. (noting that this study is hindered by Section 203).
44. Letter from Katherine R. Smith, Executive Director, Council of
Professional Associations on Federal Statistics, to National Technical Information
Service (Mar. 23, 2015) (on file with author).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Currently, there is no good alternative source for researchers to get
47
this mortality information.
Section 203 has jeopardized this research by terminating those
without prior certification from access to recent DMF entries,
48
which is a difficult, expensive, and cumbersome process. While
Section 203 impedes these researchers’ work, in enacting Section
203, Congress also failed to hold accountable either the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) or the Treasury Department (Treasury), key
departments responsible for both causing and exacerbating the
49
lapses in privacy protection. Closing off the DMF will likely
50
exacerbate fraud. The DMF is “not the source of the fraud,” and is
actually a mechanism to stop fraud, therefore denying access to the
51
DMF will not end the fraud. In fact, “[n]ow that the SSDI is
behind a pay wall which can track who accesses which record, the
identity thieves are migrating . . . to living people . . . whose SSNs
52
are available from a plethora of sources . . . .”
B.

The DMF and Tax Fraud

While identity theft has been documented for nearly two
53
decades, it was in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks
that privacy protections and fraudulent misuse of SSNs began to
47. Id.
48. See Moss Testimony, supra note 29, at 4. Anecdotal information indicates
that universities are refusing their researchers permission to apply for certification
because of objections to the affirmations. For Section 203 details and interim
regulations, see infra Section II.A.
49. Kenneth H. Ryesky, Comments to Into the Sunset for SSDI, LEGAL
GENEALOGIST
BLOG
(July
23,
2013,
3:43
PM),
http://www.legalgenealogist.com/blog/2013 /07/23/johnson-into-the-sunset-forssdi/ [hereinafter Ryesky Blog Comments July 23, 2013].
50. Goodman, Returns of the Living Dead, supra note 7.
51. Leah McGrath Goodman, The Deathly Flaw Buried in the Budget Deal,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.newsweek.com/deathly-flaw-buried-deepbudget-deal-224764 [hereinafter Goodman, The Deathly Flaw].
52. Ryesky Blog Comments July 23, 2013, supra note 49. Following
complaints that thieves were exploiting the DMF, many genealogy websites
withheld SSN access; Ancestry.com did so in November 2011. See Kerry Kavanaugh,
Police: ID Fraud Victims Tied to Ancestry.com, WSBTV (Mar. 2, 2012, 6:20 PM),
http://www.wsbtv.com/news/news/local/police-id-fraud-victims-tied-ancestrycom
/nLKQ3/.
53. Documentation exists from 1997. See Jonathan J. Darrow & Stephen D.
Lichtenstein, “Do You Really Need My Social Security Number?” Data Collection Practices
in the Digital Age, 10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2008).

9. Scharf (791-863) (Do Not Delete)

5/2/2016 9:52 PM

802

[Vol. 42:791

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW
54

receive attention from Congress. Legislative activity was scant
before 2011. In September 2011, identical identity theft bills were
introduced in the Senate and in the House of Representatives
55
(House). Each of these bills would have restricted DMF access to a
decedent’s records for one year following their death and
implemented a certification program to exempt some researchers
56
from that delay.
Ironically, IRS actions triggered the significant tax fraud issues.
The administration of George W. Bush, implementing the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, sought to distribute
57
stimulus payments to taxpayers quickly, expediting refunds by
58
59
suspending DMF cross-checking, thus enabling the fraudsters.
54. See How SSA Gathers and Distributes Death Information, Hearing on the Social
Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 2036, Before the
Comm. on Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 107th Cong. (2001),
https://ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_110801.html (statement of Frederick
Streckewald, Acting Assistant Deputy Comm’r for Disability and Income Security
Programs). In 1976, the Federal Advisory Committee on False Identification
reported criminal use of false identification as “a multibillion dollar . . . problem.”
U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, THE REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FALSE
IDENTIFICATION
xi
(1976),
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1
.b4178088;view=1up;seq=17 (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
55. See S. 1534, 112th Cong. § 9 (2011) (Sen. Nelson, Fla., proposing); H.R.
Res. 3215, 112th Cong. § 9 (2011) (Rep. Castor, Fla., proposing). This short-lived
embargo contrasts with the three/four-year embargo in Section 203. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1306c(a).
56. S. 1534; H.R. Res. 3215.
57. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001). See Press Release, U.S.
S. Comm. on Fin., Baucus Presses IRS Nominee for Quick Action on Stimulus
Checks
(Jan.
29,
2008),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom
/chairman/release/?id=64ecc461-7f5b-4b82-b5bb-22a3bb1d0fd2 (“‘We need to be
certain of the ability of the IRS to respond quickly in getting much-needed tax
rebates into the hands of millions of Americans,’ [Senator Max] Baucus said.”).
58. Because refunds are often distributed before employers submit wage
information, the IRS has no time to verify the information. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IDENTITY THEFT: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD HELP IRS
COMBAT THE LARGE, EVOLVING THREAT OF REFUND FRAUD (2014), http://www.gao
.gov/assets/670/665368.pdf. Moreover, the IRS processed returns without using
all data available to validate that only qualifying children were claimed, or to
identify returns that might be fraudulently using SSNs of the deceased. TREASURY
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004),
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/semiannual/semiannual_sept2004.htm.
59. Treasury audits found “that the IRS frequently issues refunds before
checking to see whether the recipient has died.” Gregory Korte, ‘Death Master File’
Remains Fodder for Scams, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2014, 5:35 PM),
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Though it is unclear how the fraudsters learned of this lax
oversight, most likely they had already filed false claims, so, when
some were approved, the verification weaknesses became evident,
60
prompting more fraud. Undoubtedly, had hospitals, insurance
companies, or other private entities holding this information
operated in a similar fashion, public outcry and litigation would
61
have ensued.
62
There have been only a few successful criminal prosecutions
of cases in which the SSNs of deceased persons were stolen from
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/02/06/anti-fraud-effortsstalled-as-death-master-file-lives-on/5231223. In 2011, there were nineteen
thousand such returns. Id.
60. Michael Kranish, IRS Is Overwhelmed by Identity Theft Fraud, BOS. GLOBE
(Feb.
16,
2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/02/16
/identity-theft-taxpayer-information-major-problem-for-irs
/7SC0BarZMDvy07bbhDXwvN/story.html (“‘When the IRS gets a return that
claims a refund, [it] does not have the ability to check that the taxpayer is entitled
to’ it, former IRS commissioner Gibbs explained. ‘They just send the check. The
crooks found out it was nirvana, and . . . you have seen a massive influx of
fraud.’”).
61. Likely common law causes of actions could have included negligence,
invasion of privacy, and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.
62. In one prosecution, the government alleged that defendant Ivory Bolen
used DMF data from online genealogy sites and prison records. Ms. Bolen
admitted obtaining SSNs and other personal identifying information (PII), even
concerning children, thereupon filing tax returns. See Zaneta Lowe, Woman Pleads
Guilty to Tax Fraud, Admits She Stole IDs from Dead People, WREG MEMPHIS (Apr. 22,
2014 2:39 PM), http://wreg.com/2014/04/22/women-pleads-guilty-to-tax-fraudadmits-she-stole-ids-from-dead-people. Her plea indicated that she “filed
approximately eighty-seven false federal tax returns in 2012, claiming $696,435 in
refunds. The IRS . . . was defrauded into paying approximately $161,154. [She]
filed approximately thirty-nine false federal tax returns in 2013, claiming
$168,969. . . . The IRS paid . . . about $209,243. . . .” See Bolen Plea Agreement at 8,
United States v. Bolen, Case No. 1:14-cr-08-WKW-SRW (M.D. Ala. Jan. 27, 2014).
Whether these admissions are true is unclear. The IRS Report, fails to mention
one DMF-related case. Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Criminal Investigation Combats
Identity Theft Refund Fraud (2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRSCriminal-Investigation-Combats-Identity-Theft-Refund-Fraud; Press Release, Office
of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alabama Woman Sentenced for Stolen
Identity
Refund
Fraud
(Apr.
24,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/April/14-tax-432.html. For additional cases,
see Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Texas, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Kaufman County Man Admits Using Identities of Deceased Persons to
Claim
Federal
Income
Tax
Refunds
(Jan.
8,
2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/txn/PressRelease/2013/JAN2013/jan8cano
_jason_tax_fraud_plea.html (included deceased 16-year-olds’ information
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the DMF. One of these involved Kaitlyn McClung, a five-month
64
old who died in May 2009, and another involved Alexis Agin, a
65
child who died in January 2011, just before her fifth birthday.
These cases are similar in key aspects. The IRS rejected the
McClungs’ income tax return because Kaitlyn had already been
66
claimed on another return, presumably the fraudster’s, who
apparently filed a tax return claiming Kaitlyn and using a SSN
67
other than Mr. McClung’s or his wife’s. The IRS’s failure to “red68
flag” the fraudulent return constitutes a “processing failure.”

garnered from the DMF); see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W.
Dist. of Tenn., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memphis Resident Sentenced to 14 Years in
Federal Prison For Tax and Identity Theft Scheme (May 16, 2012),
http://web.archive.org/web/20130603203910/http://www.justice.gov/usao/tnw
/news/2012/MAY16Mayweather.html. In 2009 data, the GAO reported about
ninety thousand false claims made based on DMF-originated data. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID: FRAUD AND ABUSE RELATED TO CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES IDENTIFIED IN SELECTED STATES (2009), http://www.gao.gov
/assets/300/294710.pdf.
63. On December 17, 2013, Senator Nelson cited cases involving child
victims of identity theft following death, but theft was not proved to have
originated in the DMF. Richard Rubin, Death List Limits to Curb Tax Fraud by Identity
Thieves, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2013-12-18/death-list-limits-to-curb-tax-fraud-by-identity-thieves
[hereinafter Rubin, Death List Limits]. Nor is there evidence of a genealogist using
these records improperly (though others have: in 2014, a former bank branch
manager pled to participating in an identity theft scheme using customers’ SSNs.)
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Former Branch Manager of Bank Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to
Cashing over $400,000 in Fraudulently Obtained Tax Refund Checks
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/December14
/MejiaEdwinPleaPR.php.
64. The Spread of Tax Fraud by Identity Theft: A Threat to Taxpayers, A Drain on
the Public Treasury Before United States S. Comm. on Fin. Subcomm. on Fiscal Resp. and
Econ. Growth,113th Cong.(May 25, 2011), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc /Testimony%20of%20Terry%20McClung.pdf [hereinafter McClung
Statement May 25, 2011] (statement of Terry D. McClung, Jr.).
65. Hearing on the Accuracy and Uses of the Social Security Administration’s Death
Master File Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., 113th
Cong. 61 (Feb. 2, 2012), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Agin
_Testimony202ss.pdf [hereinafter Agin Testimony Feb. 2, 2012] (statement of
Jonathan Eric Agin). Both McClung and Agin knew of other bereaved parents in
similar circumstances. Id.
66. McClung Statement May 25, 2011, supra note 64, at 1.
67. Id.
68. Ryesky Statement Feb. 5, 2012, supra note 33, at 201.
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Similarly, apparently someone retrieved Alexis Agin’s SSN,
presumably from the DMF, before her parents filed their return,
69
and submitted one listing Alexis as a dependent. Subsequently,
the parents’ legitimate claim was denied, beginning a trying time
during which the Agins had to prove Alexis was their daughter in
70
order to complete their filing. Alexis’ father, a lawyer and lobbyist,
71
took his story to Texas Representative Sam Johnson.
Both sets of parents suffered further following this thievery, as
the IRS assumed the legitimacy of initial filers, while the parents,
72
the subsequent filers, were doubted. The government, after
making the DMF vulnerable to fraudsters, enabled fraudulent
payments and then exacerbated its transgression by failing to
73
expeditiously address the parents’ needs. Additionally, the
government went further by using these circumstances to justify
closing DMF access. Notwithstanding the understandable sympathy
felt towards these families, one must still ask whether, in a society
exceeding three hundred million people, the experience of a
74
relative few justifies this legislation that adversely affects so many.

69. Agin Testimony Feb. 2, 2012, supra note 65, at 61.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See McClung Statement May 25, 2011, supra note 64; Agin Testimony Feb.
2, 2012, supra note 65; see also Kenneth H. Ryesky, Comments on Proposed
Treasury Regulations Regarding Truncated Taxpayer Identification Numbers,
REG-148873-09
at
5
(Jan.
14,
2013),
http://www.regulations.gov
/#!documentDetail;D=IRS-2013-0004-0003 [hereinafter Ryesky Comments Jan. 14,
2013].
73. See McClung Statement May 25, 2011, supra note 64 (“The IRS had
opened a federal investigation, and that’s the last information we
were . . . told. . . . To this day, we don’t know what if anything has come out of
this.”). While extant privacy constraints prevented the IRS from sharing case
details with law enforcement, the Identity Theft Victim Disclosure Waiver Process
now uses victim waivers to permit information release for investigations. See
Hearing on Tax Fraud and Identity Theft: Moving Forward with Solutions Before S. Fin.
Comm.,
113th
Cong.
8
(2013)
[hereinafter
Miller
Testimony],
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/Miller%20Testimony.pdf
(statement of Steven T. Miller).
74. Mr. Agin learned of several other families who experienced the same
identity theft. Agin Testimony Feb. 2, 2012, supra note 65, at 62.
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76

1. The IRS Ignored Persistent Warnings of PII Theft and DMF
Abuse

For years prior to Section 203’s enactment, the IRS was aware
of system vulnerabilities that could lead to widespread identity
77
theft. First, the SSN is “central to the commission of the crime of
78
identity theft.” According to a 2002 General Accountability Office
(GAO) Report, the SSN is one of the three pieces of information
79
most sought by identity thieves. There have been considerable
80
warnings concerning the dangers of the widespread use of SSNs.
The GAO has generated over twenty such warnings since 2002,
81
addressing the misuse of SSNs and recommending reform.
FTC representatives urged the House Committee on Ways and
Means to demand “comprehensive reviews of both private and
82
public sector usage of SSNs.” Significantly, even the SSA
counseled against the disclosure of SSNs, discouraging banks and
83
other businesses from using them for identification purposes.
Nonetheless, as of 2008, forty-one states and three-quarters of the
84
nation’s counties continued to display SSNs on public records.

75. The losses are staggering; the Federal Trade Commission estimates
annual costs exceeding $50,000,000,000. In 1997, a credit card company reported
annual losses approaching $400,000,000. Identity theft is both the fastest-growing
financial crime and the fastest-growing crime in the United States Darrow &
Lichtenstein, supra note 53, at 8–9 (internal citation omitted). Importantly, these
numbers do not distinguish generic identity theft from DMF theft.
76. Credit card companies’ data is breached regularly yet there are no
known efforts to outlaw credit cards. See infra Section II.B.2.b (comment
attributable to Barbara J. Mathews).
77. Grayson Barber, Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the
Public Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L REV. 63, 108 (2006) (“The Social
Security Number originally ensured that workers paid into the system but soon
became a prerequisite for taxation and government services, and . . . [became] the
key to massive amounts of personal data.”).
78. Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra note 53, at 9.
79. Id. at 9. According to Jones Day, an international law firm, the SSN is
“the No. 1 identifier used by criminals in identity theft.” Id. (citation omitted).
When identifying the SSN the “most valuable commodity for an identity thief,” the
President's Identity Theft Task Force described it as “critical” and “key” for thieves.
Id. at 10. (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 9.
81. Id. at 39.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 9–10.
84. Id. at 15; see also Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records,
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States have begun to address identity theft; from California to
Connecticut, Vermont to New York, Minnesota to New Mexico,
Virginia to Rhode Island, and Maine to Massachusetts, attempts are
underway to reduce the scope of readily available personal
85
identifying information (PII), with some states restricting access to
86
87
vital records. Similar attempts exist internationally.
The prevalent use of stolen identities to commit tax refund
88
fraud has risen to “alarming levels.” A 2009 study revealed that, in
the five previous years, about five hundred million records
containing the PII of U.S. “residents stored in government and
89
corporate databases [were] either lost or stolen.” In 2010, nearly
five hundred thousand incidents of a stolen identity being used to
90
file tax returns were reported. By 2011, the incidents more than
91
92
doubled, costing billions of dollars annually.
Theft of PII of living individuals far exceeds that involving the
93
deceased. The June 2008 report of the SSA’s Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) indicated that, “from January 2004
through April 2007, SSA’s publication of the DMF resulted in the
Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1199–1200 (2002) (noting that
SSNs are “a gateway to highly sensitive information such as financial accounts,
school records, and a host of other data” and should be redacted from every
document prior to public disclosure, and recommending that the Federal Privacy
Act be amended to provide more meaningful SSN protections).
85. It is difficult for states to succeed in their efforts to address identity theft.
Even scholars have expressed alarm at the degree of PII publically available
through state sources. Solove, supra note 84, at 1144–49.
86. See Editorial, Genealogists Shouldn’t Need Town Hall Appointments,
HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 30, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.courant.com/opinion
/editorials/hc-ed-genealogists-must-call-ahead-for-vital-recor-20140930-story.html
(referring to recent attempts by the Connecticut legislature to restrict
genealogists’ access to vital record).
87. Jan Meisels Allen et al., Genealogy Under Fire: Government Actions to Impede
Access to Records You Need, INT’L ASS’N OF JEWISH GENEALOGICAL SOC’YS (2013),
http://www.iajgs.org/pramc/Handout%20for%20IAJGS%20Records
%20Access%20Session-final.pdf.
88. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FIN., SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT: TAX
ADMIN. 1 (2013), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chairman’s
%20Staff%20Discussion%20Draft%20of%20Tax%20Administration%20Reform%
20Summary.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT].
89. Allen Statement Mar. 2012, supra note 29, at 2.
90. SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 88.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Hearing on Social Security’s Death Records, supra note 4.
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potential exposure of PII for more than twenty thousand living
94
individuals erroneously listed as deceased,” while the numbers of
PII stolen from the deceased were likely so insignificant that they
were not even reported.
In fact, prosecutions of SSN-related fraud point in many
95
directions beyond the DMF. A study conducted by the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), which was a
rigorous examination of the variety of this fraud, identified seven
categories of undetected individuals whose SSNs were used in this
way and only one category involved the deceased, representing only
19,102 people whose SSNs were abused, out of approximately 1.1
96
million taxpayers. Moreover, that DMF records may have been
unlawfully accessed does not prove that this access caused the
resulting fraud—fraudsters could have received details of deaths
from medical institutions, schools, prisons, and more.
In any event, the TIGTA study “deceased” category indicates
that the maximum percentage of the files that could have been
compromised through DMF use was 1.8 percent; embargoing the
97
DMF will have no effect on the remaining 98.2 percent.
Additionally, fraudulently paid claims traceable to IRS records
98
abuse pale in comparison to those paid by other federal agencies.
“In 2012, the IRS recovered 210,003 fraudulent tax refunds totaling

94. Id.
95. See McClung Statement May 25, 2011, supra note 64; Agin Testimony Feb.
2, 2012, supra note 65. It has been assumed that thieves accessed the McClung and
Agin information from the DMF or genealogy websites. Agin Testimony Feb. 2,
2012, supra note 65. Other possible sources, particularly involving Agin, include
medical caregivers privy to the information. Id.; see also Blankley, supra note 4, at
418–19 n.20. (“[I]t is hard to determine exactly where the wrongdoers procured
their information. At least one crime ring admitted to using PACER, the federal
online database, in order to secure personal information about prisoners . . .[and]
open false bank and credit accounts.”); Videotape: Hearing on Tax Fraud and Tax
ID Theft: Moving Forward with Solutions (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.finance
.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=62739085-5056-a032-5281-4500bf4d4fb3 (Agin
testimony at hour 1:00-1:03).
96. TIGTA Report Sept. 20, 2013, supra note 20, at 8 (analyzing tax year 2011
returns); see also Goodman, The Deathly Flaw, supra note 51.
97. See Barbara J. Mathews, RPAC 2013 Year-End Report: SSDI Recent-Death
Redactions Begin in 90 Days, BOARD FOR CERTIFICATION OF GENEALOGISTS (Dec. 18,
2013), http://bcgcertification.org/blog/2013/12/rpac-2013-year-end-report-ssdirecent-death-redactions-begin-in-90-days.
98. Goodman, Returns of the Living Dead, supra note 7.
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more than $779 million,” while other federal agencies that year
99
improperly distributed nearly $108 billion.
Admittedly, there is likely some fraudulent use of the DMF to
100
access SSNs, but there is reliable proof that causes other than the
101
DMF are responsible for far more. Take, for example, Alan Scott,
who was convicted in 1998 for making false claims to a United
102
States agency. He aimed to obtain $80,000 in 1996 by claiming
refunds for at least twelve people through the filing of twenty false
103
104
returns. Scott used names and SSNs of the living.
A case involving a Los Angeles-based financial planner who
“pleaded guilty to . . . fil[ing] more than 900 false income tax
105
refund claims” was erroneously portrayed as DMF fraud. David
Sanborn obtained SSNs from files at United Grocers, where he
worked, not from the DMF, then used software to create fictitious
businesses, issued false wage statements using the stolen names,
106
and prepared refund requests for mail drops nationwide.
Though the connection between illegal use of SSNs and DMF
fraud has rarely been proved, it is certain that the IRS has
mismanaged the information it collects. In fact, this lax
107
safeguarding has become a joke to those in the field. “Right now,
the question is, what does it take to get the IRS to pay you cash
money? The answer is, all it takes is a social security number and
name—and the IRS won’t check it!” stated board-certified
genealogist Barbara J. Mathews, who advocated for confronting the

99. Id. While this may contrast apples and oranges, it illustrates the
comparatively insignificant amounts involved in IRS record abuse. Id.
100. See Rubin, Death List Limits, supra note 63. An alternate explanation
blames unscrupulous medical workers. See Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra note 53,
at 16.
101. United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1007 (2002).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 37.
105. See Jim Herron Zamora, Mastermind of Tax Return Fraud Ring Gets 4 1/2
Years: Courts: The Studio City Financial Planning Expert Admitted Conspiring to File More
Than 900 False Refund Claims Nationwide. Two Others Await Trial, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8,
1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-10-08/local/me-982_1_financial-planning
-expert.
106. Id.
107. See Goodman, The Deathly Flaw, supra note 51.
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underlying issue—IRS incompetence.
Another professional
genealogist, forensic genealogist Sharon Sergeant, lamented:
The IRS is handing out money like candy—and nobody
wants to acknowledge it . . . . Why isn’t it checking to
make sure dead people aren’t getting tax returns?
Somebody who reads the obituaries and makes up a social
security number the right way, according to the
algorithm, can file a tax return and get a payment. It’s got
nothing to do with the Death Master File. It has
109
everything to do with the IRS not doing its job.
Certain IRS failures are curious. Reviewing Treasury audits of
the filings from 2011 “the top five addresses used on fraudulent tax
returns . . . combined with the volume of payments to those
110
addresses, should have raised all kinds of red flags at the IRS.”
During a five-year period, losses suffered from false payments could
111
total $26,000,000,000. The recipients are located worldwide, from
Kaunas, Lithuania, from which 655 tax returns were sent to the
same address, to Shanghai, China, from which 343 returns were
112
sent to one location. A scheme in Tampa, Florida, that filed false
tax returns online amounted to more than $130 million in tax
113
fraud. The profits were so substantial that some police attributed
a drop in local illegal drug activity to the more reliable income
114
dealers were earning through false IRS filings.
Despite the gravity of the problem, many suggestions offered
to ameliorate the situation have been ignored, allowing the theft to
115
continue in the meantime. In its February 2012 Report, the SSA’s
OIG recommended that the SSA delay releasing DMF updates,
116
allowing time to correct erroneous entries. The Treasury likewise
tried to persuade the IRS to limit issuing tax refunds to the same

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Scott Zamost, Identity Thieves Could Rake in $26 Billion in Tax Refunds,
CNN (May 8, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/08/us/tax-refund-fraud.
112. Goodman, Returns of the Living Dead, supra note 7.
113. Alessandra Da Pra, Epic Tax Scam Uncovered in Tampa, SEMINOLE HEIGHTS
PATCH (Sept. 2, 2011), http://patch.com/florida/seminoleheights/epic-tax-scamuncovered-in-tampa.
114. Id.
115. See supra Section II.A.b.1.
116. See Hearing on Social Security’s Death Records, supra note 4.
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117

bank account. The delay in making these changes, which will not
be operational until 2017, will result in a loss of up to $385 million
118
annually.
The IRS was also asked to “scrutinize returns more aggressively
. . . through the use of better filters and the comparison of various
available databases to recognize deceased individuals on tax
119
returns.” In April 2013, acting Treasury Commissioner Steven T.
Miller presented to the Senate Finance Committee numerous
possible enhancements, including expanding prosecutions and
120
screening cases to identify false returns before issuing refunds.
The IRS’s meager response spurred even a Congress infamous for
121
122
inaction to take action and enact Section 203.
Genealogists also suggested fixes, including eliminating SSNs
123
as Medicare identification. The practice ensures that SSNs are
not:
[R]evealed to numerous clerks working in the billing
offices of every doctor’s office, medical lab, therapist,
hospital or nursing home from which a senior receives
health related services, including independent companies
to
which
the
healthcare
providers
may
outsource, . . . [making] the healthcare industry . . . fertile
ground for identity thieves, with thousands of cases of
identity theft originating there in recent years. Private
insurers were required to abandon the use of social
security numbers as health insurance ID . . . years
ago . . . . [T]he US military has also ceased to use social
security numbers as serial numbers . . . . Medicare has

117. Hearing on Identify Theft and Tax Fraud Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 3 (2012),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/JRussellGeorge_OS_SS_5_8_12.
pdf (statement of Honorable J. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Admin.).
118. TIGTA Report Sept. 20, 2013, supra note 20.
119. Allen, AVOTAYNU, supra note 30, at 50.
120. Moss Testimony, supra note 29, at 5 (citing Tax Fraud and Tax ID Theft:
Moving Forward with Solutions: Hearing Before U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin. (2013),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=62739085-5056-a032-52814500bf4d4fb3) (referencing Miller’s testimony).
121. See supra text accompanying note 4.
122. See Moss Testimony, supra note 29, at 4.
123. GR Gordon, Comment to Johnson: Into the Sunset for SSDI, LEGAL
GENEALOGIST (July 23, 2013, 2:14 PM), http://www.legalgenealogist.com/blog
/2013/07/23/johnson-into-the-sunset-for-ssdi/.
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supposedly been “studying” the issue for years, but has yet
124
to come up with a concrete plan . . . .
The lax nature of the IRS’s verification methodologies is hard
to fathom. For example, one criminal complaint described a
randomly-selected tax return that requested a childcare credit; the
return used a SSN for the caregiver belonging to someone living a
125
considerable distance from the applicant. Such a discrepancy
“should not be discovered because the tax return is ‘randomly
126
127
selected.’” Clearly, the IRS, with its unrestricted DMF access,
could prevent much of the false filing fraud by checking refund
128
claims against the DMF before paying them. For, “[i]f thieves
129
were using the SSDI, the IRS clearly was not.” The 2012 Tax
Advocate’s Report to Congress criticized the IRS for its lack of
130
response to these issues. While the 2012 Tax Advocate’s Report
suggested that stakeholders, such as the Tax Advocate and those
adversely affected by tax identity fraud, be involved in creating
131
solutions, notably, Section 203 does not mention the IRS.
More recently, the GAO discussed issues involving the IRS’s
ongoing failure to address tax return identity theft. In Identity Theft:
Additional Actions Could Help IRS Combat the Large, Evolving Threat of
124. Id. In April 2015, President Obama signed a bill ending the use of SSNs
on Medicare cards. Medicare Cards to Shift ID Numbers, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2015,
at A2.
125. Ryesky Comments Jan. 14, 2013, supra note 72, at 5.
126. Id.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (2014).
128. E-mail from Kenneth H. Ryesky to author (Apr. 20, 2014) (on file with
author).
129. Moss Testimony, supra note 29, at 4.
130. National Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 21, at 6.
131. See Ryesky Blog Comments July 23, 2013, supra note 49 (noting that,
“[c]onspicuous by its absence from the bill text is any reference to the IRS
or . . . Treasury . . . . [R]eal countermeasures to tax fraud identity theft must
directly involve the IRS,” and that the IRS’s poor “data stewardship” is the
problem.”); see also Ryesky Comments Jan. 14, 2013, supra note 72, at 4, 9 (the
problem has resulted “in an epidemic of tax fraud through stolen identity
perpetuated by fraudsters who exploit the gaping lacunae in the IRS’s data
stewardship practices . . . . The IRS has known of the problem . . . well beyond the
past decade; . . . failure to properly verify and match the data on the tax
returns . . . is costing America dearly, not only in dollars . . . but in public
confidence . . . .”); Press Release, U.S. Attorney S. Dist. of Ind., New York City Man
Sentenced
in
Tax
Refund
Conspiracy
(Jan.
4,
2002),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/tax/usaopress/2002/txdv0201042002_1.htm
(describing sentencing of New York individual for tax fraud refund conspiracy).
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Refund Fraud, it highlighted the estimated $29.4 billion in
132
attempted fraud occurring in the 2013 filing season;
conspicuously absent from the list of the sources of these
fraudulent refund requests was the DMF, a clue that the IRS has
begun screening refund returns against fraud detection filters, with
133
promising results. The question this raises is obvious: Was the
stated objective of Section 203 accomplished even before it was
134
enacted?
Overstatement of the DMF’s role in identity theft frustrates
researchers, stymied by the new restrictions. However, according to
Jan Meisels Allen, “Use of the SSDI actually could be an effective
identity fraud deterrent. If the IRS matched the filings in its
computer database against those listed on the SSDI who now are
deceased, fewer inappropriate tax refunds would go to those
135
perpetrating identity theft of the deceased.”
Rather than
restricting or curtailing open access to the DMF, “[t]he SSDI
136
should be retained and used effectively.”

132. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IDENTITY THEFT: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
COULD HELP IRS COMBAT THE LARGE, EVOLVING THREAT OF REFUND FRAUD 10
(2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665368.pdf. An audit conducted between
May and August 2014 found the IRS estimated it prevented/recovered about $24.2
billion (eighty-two percent) of attempted fraud. Id. at 3–10. “What GAO Found”
(inside page) concluded that “[s]tronger [p]re-refund and [p]ost-refund
[s]trategies [c]an [h]elp [c]ombat IDT [r]efund [f]raud.” Id. at 13 (indicating the
difficulty of “pay and chase” aspects of fraud recovery). These strategies “[m]ay
[p]revent [b]illions of [d]ollars in [e]stimated IDT [r]efund [f]raud . . . .” Id.
at 14.
133. See id. at 3 (“[The] IRS instituted IDT filters in 2012, which helped IRS
find additional IDT incidents.”).
134. See Miller Testimony, supra note 73; see also Fred Moss, Senate Finance
Committee 16 April Hearing—Tax Fraud and Tax ID Theft, RECORDS PRESERVATION AND
ACCESS COMMITTEE (May 5, 2013), http://www.fgs.org/rpac/2013/05 /05/senatefinance-committee-16-april-hearing-update-pending. DMF fraud is not mentioned
in the recent TIGTA report, wherein the Treasury critiques the IRS’s report on
prisoner tax refund fraud for excluding information about fraudulent returns.
Kenneth H. Ryesky, Slow Learners at the IRS, AMERICAN THINKER (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/12/slow_learners_a
t_the_irs.html#ixzz3Khj5zpum.
135. Allen, AVOTAYNU, supra note 30, at 50.
136. Id.
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2.

Tax Return Identity Theft Caused by Sources beyond the DMF

For several years prior to Section 203’s enactment, numerous
congressional committees were informed of causes of identity theft
beyond the DMF. Attorney Fred Moss’s January 2014 submission to
the Senate Committee on Finance emphasized this: “To the extent
that [SSDI] may ever have been used, the thieves have moved
137
on.” Moss also noted that, based on a list of people recently
sentenced for identity theft, the SSNs had been stolen: (1) from a
community college’s financial aid office; (2) by trickery used to
secure taxpayer’s personal information; (3) from a medical center
138
records office; or (4) by breaking into a tax preparer’s office.
Additionally, in another case, a “trusted user” of a commercially139
available, non-genealogical site misused an online database.
a.

Misuse of State Databases

The degree of publicly available PII in various state records has
140
alarmed some. In 2002, for example, shortly after a Cincinnati
employer used a county website to research job applicants, he was
the victim of SSN theft, apparently acquired from a traffic ticket
141
available online. Also, despite the fact that Ohio traffic tickets are
public records, state law does not allow for the “redaction of
142
sensitive materials” before the records are put online.
Vulnerabilities such as these have led some to seek dramatic
143
restrictions on public access to records of court hearings.

137. Moss Testimony, supra note 29, at 5.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 5–6. Others revealing PII include hospitals, stores, universities, and
workers. See Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra note 53, at 16, 22, 23, 37, 38; see also
Tom Zeller, Jr., Breach Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/24/business/24datas.html?pagewanted=print
&position=.
140. Various state suggestions have surfaced. In Minnesota, documents may be
separated between public and private files for civil cases, and access to certain
criminal case documents restricted. Solove, supra note 84, at 1199.
141. Blankley, supra note 4, at 419 n.23.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
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Theft of Credit Card Information

The ongoing assault against all types of consumers, from those
visiting high-end stores (like Nieman Marcus), to the more
economically-minded (like Target), persists. The PII of as many as
110 million Target customers was stolen in 2013, apparently by
144
malware installed on store terminals.
The Nieman Marcus
attacks, between July and October 2013, struck eleven million
credit and debit cardholders, apparently using the same malware
145
used against Target. Since then, MasterCard, Visa, and Discover
have informed Nieman Marcus of fraudulent activity involving
146
about 2,400 cards used at its stores. Store representatives claim
147
they were unaware of the theft before mid-December 2013. In
148
September 2014, Home Depot also fell victim to a similar attack,
compromising not only payment cards, but also fifty-three million
149
customer e-mail addresses.
Banks and governments are not
immune from attacks either: In September 2014, J.P. Morgan
acknowledged a cyber attack the prior summer against about
150
seventy-six million households.
In November 2014, the U.S.
Postal Service revealed a major computer data theft potentially
compromising information about postal employees’ names, birth
151
dates, addresses, and SSNs.

144. Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach Numbers Grow,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business
/target-breach-affected-70-million-customers.html?_r=0.
145. Elizabeth A. Harris et al., Neiman Marcus Data Breach Worse Than First Said,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014, at B1.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Mitch Lipka, Home Depot Hack Could Lead to $3 Billion in Fake Charges, CBS
NEWS: MONEY WATCH (Sept. 16, 2014, 8:06 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news
/credit-monitoring-company-home-depot-breach-could-result-in-2b-in-fraud.
149. Nicole Perlroth, Home Depot Says Hackers Also Stole E-mail Addresses, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014, 6:38 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/homedepot-says-hackers-also-stole-email-addresses.
150. Emily Glazer & Danny Yadron, J.P. Morgan Says about 76 Million
Households Affected By Cyber Breach, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2014, 9:32 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-says-about-76-million-householdsaffected-by-cyber-breach-1412283372.
151. David E. Sanger, Postal Service Reveals Theft of Computer Data on Employees,
BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 11, 2014, at A2. The problem is monumental, with the attacks on
SONY Pictures in late 2014 emblematic. See Brooks Barnes & Nicole Perlroth,
SONY Breach, Now Wider, Draws Alert from F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at B1.
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c.

Public Access to Electronic Court Records (PACER)

PACER, the publicly-accessible system for case records that are
neither sealed nor otherwise restricted, remains an additional
152
source of identity theft. To date, one crime ring has admitted to
using PACER to access prisoners’ PII in order to open bank and
153
credit accounts. This system will shortly undergo an expansion
enabling users to search all courts from a single site, free of charge,
154
at courthouses. Not surprisingly, opponents of expanded access
155
are preparing resistance to this effort.
d.

Common Sloppiness (and Theft)

Everyday life stands as a cause of much PII exposure. SSNs can
be found in a variety of places such as “on websites, in trash cans
and dumpsters, including refuse containers of hospitals, schools,
156
law firms, and banking and finance institutions.”
Law
enforcement personnel inadequately shredding documents can
also place SSNs in the public arena “when the paper shreddings
157
[sic] are used as confetti at public parades and celebrations.”
Additionally, “[t]he images stored on . . . hard drives of copy
158
machines are natural vehicles for SSNs” and “[p]aper records in
transit can, during a crash or other misadventure, be spilled,
strewn, and dispersed along the highway; indeed, traffic mishaps
159
with such potential have befallen the IRS’s own couriers.”
e.

Tax Refund Fraud against the Living

A more significant problem than DMF-related abuse is tax
refund fraud against the living. According to Moss, “It is significant
that all three recent cases of tax fraud identity theft

152. Darrow & Lichtestein, supra note 53.
153. Id.; see also Blankley, supra note 4.
154. Paula J. Hane, Wider Access to U.S. Court Records Database Stirs Up
Controversy, INFORMATION TODAY, INC.: NEWS BREAKS & THE WEEKLY NEWS DIGEST
(Feb. 12, 2001), http://newsbreaks.infotoday.com/NewsBreaks/Wider-Access-toUS-Court-Records-Database-Stirs-Up-Controversy-17657.asp.
155. Id.
156. Ryesky Comments Jan. 4, 2013, supra note 72, at 6–7 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 7.
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mentioned . . . involved living victims, rather than the deceased.”
Moss also warns, “[w]e should continue to be concerned that the
SSNs of living persons will continue to be vulnerable so long as the
IRS is mandated to expedite the payment of refund claims before
they have even received information returns necessary to
161
determine their validity.”
III. FORMULATING SECTION 203

Notwithstanding that only a small portion of tax return
162
identity theft is due to public access to SSNs through the DMF,
one family’s story seems to have inspired Representative Johnson’s
163
campaign to end public access to the DMF.
Representative
Johnson’s efforts may have provided cover for the void the IRS
created when it failed to close loopholes, cross-check SSNs before
164
165
issuing refunds, or steward PII in its possession. Representative
160. Moss Testimony, supra note 29, at 5–6 (referencing Acting IRS
Commissioner Miller’s testimony on April 16, 2013 at a hearing before the S. Fin.
Comm.). Significant PII breaches have befallen living persons erroneously
included in the DMF as deceased. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SSA, PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC VIA THE DEATH
MASTER FILE (2008), http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/html/A-0608-18042.html; see also Lori Kurtzman, World War II Vet Works to Convince the IRS that
He’s Not Dead, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 23, 2015 3:43 PM), http://www
.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/01/23/IRS_snafu.html?ncid.
161. Moss Testimony, supra note 29, at 9.
162. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. The scant impact of this
was apparent during a September 21, 2014, segment of 60 Minutes, which did not
even mention theft of deceased persons’ records. See Steve Kroft, Biggest IRS Scam
Around: Identity Tax Refund Fraud, CBS NEWS (Sept. 21, 2014),
www.cbsnews.com/news/irs-scam-identity-tax-refund-fraud-60-minutes.
163. Ryesky Blog Comments July 23, 2013, supra note 49 (noting that,
apparently, Alexis Agin’s father, Jonathan Agin, a well-spoken lawyer, was
“convinced that (1) [t]he availability of the DMF/SSDI was the cause of the
expropriation of his deceased daughter’s identity (never mind [sic] that she
received extensive medical treatments, which entail the exposure of numerous
SSNs and other personal info to numerous low-salaried, often temporary
employees); and (2) [t]he IRS’s missteps in the matter were relatively minor in
comparison to the public availability of the DMF/SSDI . . . .”).
164. See supra Section II.B.1.
165. Tax Fraud by Identity Theft, Part 2: Status, Progress, and Potential Solutions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Resp. & Econ. Growth of S. Comm. on Fin., 112th
Cong. 134, 136 (2012), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg78502
/pdf/CHRG-112shrg78502.pdf(statement of Kenneth H. Ryesky) (“[T]he IRS’s
stewardship over its data has proven to be a miserable failure.”). Information
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Johnson was seemingly unaware that denying the public access to
the DMF “would still leave a plentitude of other sources from which
166
tax fraudsters could obtain SSNs of the living and dead alike.” In
2011, while chairing the House Ways and Means Social Security
Committee, Representative Johnson, through his introduction of
167
the Keeping IDs Safe Act of 2011, sought to abolish public access to
168
the DMF beginning January 1, 2019. Johnson, a former prisoner
of war from the Vietnam era, aimed to maintain DMF access for the
Department of Defense’s POW/MIA Accounting Agency, which
provides “the fullest possible accounting for our missing personnel
169
to their families and the nation.” A subcommittee held hearings

stewardship, or who has access to data, is distinguishable from securing it, or
restricting data access. Id.; see also Sara Rosenbaum, Data Governance and
Stewardship: Designing Data Stewardship Entities and Advancing Data Access, 45 HEALTH
SERV. RES. 1442, 1442 (2010).
166. Ryesky Comments Jan. 14, 2013, supra note 72, at 8; see also supra Section
II.B.2.
167. H.R. 3475; see also Hearing on Social Security’s Death Records, supra note 4,
at 1.
168. Keeping IDs Safe Act of 2011, H.R. 3475, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Press
Release, Sam Johnson Introduces the Keeping IDs Safe Act (Nov. 18, 2011),
http://samjohnson.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=269671.
Senator Johnson’s motives have been questioned by many in the genealogical
community. See Judy G. Russell, Comment to Johnson: Into the Sunset for SSDI, LEGAL
GENEALOGIST BLOG (July 23, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.legalgenealogist
.com/blog/2013/07/23/johnson-into-the-sunset-for-ssdi/ (“Jonathan Agin was
the key witness in Rep. Johnson’s anti-genealogist hearings last year, and he is
definitely the moving force here. You can’t help but have your heart
ache . . . . [Yet] this . . . doesn’t begin to address the real issues of closing
loopholes at the IRS and controlling the misuse of Social Security numbers . . . .”);
Judy G. Russell, Johnson: Into the Sunset for SSDI, The Legal Genealogist (July 23,
2013),
http://www.legalgenealogist.com/blog/2013/07/23/johnson-into-thesunset-for-ssdi/ (“Johnson has specifically targeted genealogists as The Bad Guys
in the fight against identity theft. Hearings held by his subcommittee . . . were
specifically designed to make genealogists the scapegoat while deliberately
keeping the genealogical community from having a fair chance to present our
views.”). Kenneth Ryesky has opinions as to why genealogists were targeted. He
served as an IRS attorney and conducts genealogical research, and believes
genealogists are considered “‘low hanging fruit;’ it’s easier to close off the DMF
than use the government’s investigative resources to find out who is stealing
PII . . .” Interview with Kenneth Ryesky (Mar. 28, 2014) (on file with author). He
believes that, “had a company or hospital done this,” the bureaucrats “surely would
have been screaming,” as well as suing. Id.
169. Vision, Mission, Values, DEFENSE POW MIA ACCOUNTING AGENCY,
http://www.dpaa.mil/About/VisionMissionValues.aspx (last visited Feb. 03, 2016).
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at which genealogists’ requests to testify were denied, although they
170
were permitted to submit comments, which several did. The bill
171
was never voted upon.
In mid-2013, Johnson introduced another bill to restrict the
172
DMF, titled the Alexis Agin Identity Theft Protection Act of 2013. A
congressional record search has revealed that at least five
additional related bills that sought to limit DMF access were
173
introduced during the 113th Congress. Four died or languished
174
in committee.
One, H.R.J. Res. 59, the current subject of
175
discussion, became law.
While Representative Johnson claimed victory when Section
176
203 was enacted, his bid failed in an essential goal, as Section 203
embargoed recent information from the Public DMF for three
calendar years after a person’s death, not forever, and further,
177
JPAC was included in the embargo. Johnson voted against the
Bipartisan Budget Bill, and therefore against Section 203, but took
credit for its passage, as illustrated in a press release stating, “[a]s
chairman of the Ways and Means Social Security Subcommittee,
Johnson has led the effort to protect families and the American
taxpayer from identity thieves by restricting access to Social
178
Security’s Death Master File (DMF).”
Why did Representative Johnson and others aim at the DMF,
when it involves such a small portion of the tax fraud problem?
170. Ryesky Statement Feb. 5, 2012, supra note 33, at 3–4.
171. Keeping IDs Safe Act of 2011, H.R. 3475, 112th Cong. (2011), https:
//www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3475/all-info?resultIndex
=3#summary.
172. Alexis Agin Identity Theft Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 2720, 113th
Cong. (2013). This was co-sponsored with Rep. Xavier Becerra of California.
173. H.R. 295, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 466, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 531,
113th Cong. (2013); S. 676, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2777, 113th Cong. (2013).
174. Id.
175. H.R.J. Res. 59, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted and codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1306c (2014)).
176. Press Release, Sam Johnson, House Passes Anti-Fraud Cause
Championed by Johnson: Provision Included in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013
(Dec.
12,
2013),
http://samjohnson.house.gov/news/documentsingle
.aspx?DocumentID=364655 [hereinafter Johnson Press Release].
177. Alexis Agin Identity Theft Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 2720, 113th
Cong. (2013).
178. Johnson Press Release, supra note 176. For vote, see House Vote 640—
Passes Bipartisan Budget Bill, N.Y. TIMES, http://politics.nytimes.com/congress
/votes/113/house/1/640 (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
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Perhaps, as has been suggested, genealogists were seen as “low
hanging fruit” and aligned with few powerful supporters. Given the
insignificant number of professional genealogists in the nation, two
to three thousand (even though about eighty million people are
interested in individual genealogy), genealogists cast as the “bad
179
guys” seemed to be an easy target for blame.
The reasons underlying the DMF restrictions being located in
H.R.J. Res. 59 are unclear, as the legislative history reveals no
record of any related hearing being held in conjunction with its
180
introduction. However, it is known, though, that Johnson was
joined by other legislators targeting the DMF, including Senator
Bill Nelson and Representative Richard Nugent, both Floridians,
who introduced similar legislation. A comparison of Section 203’s
language with that of the other bills introduced reveals that
Nelson’s and Nugent’s bills were likely the blueprints for Section
203, as both their language and structure closely mirror that of
181
Section 203. Further, a November 2013 staff draft report from the
Senate’s Committee on Finance identifies Nelson’s bill as the
182
blueprint for future DMF restrictions.
Senator Nelson’s hand in this is not surprising, as he
represents Florida, which suffers some of the most flagrant
instances of tax identity fraud, even being dubbed the “Silicon
183
Valley for scam artists.” Long-serving Nelson, formerly a House
Representative, was, in the fall of 2013, a senior member of the
Senate Budget Committee, which negotiated the terms of H.R.J.
184
Res. 59. His colleague, Representative Nugent, was a member of
179. U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. and
Oversight, Joint Hearing on Identity Theft and Tax Fraud , 112th Cong. 156 (2012),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg78817/pdf/CHRG112hhrg78817.pdf (statement for the record of Kenneth Ryesky). “[T]here is
reason to fear that the [House] Hearings might . . . function as a lynch mob
against the public’s (including the genealogical community’s) interest in accessing
the . . . DMF. There is concern that the targeting of the DMF is . . . a convenient
exercise in blame assignment . . . to avoid the vexing issues inherent in crafting
real solutions.” Id.
180. H.R.J. Res. 59, 113th Cong. (2013).
181. Compare id., and S. 676, 113th Cong. (2013), with H.R. 295, 113th Cong.
(2013).
182. See SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 88 (“This proposal is
based on a provision in S.676 (113th), Identity Theft and Tax Fraud Prevention
Act of 2013, sponsored by Sen. Nelson.”).
183. Biggest IRS Scam Around, supra note 162.
184. See Biography, UNITED STATES SENATE: BILL NELSON (Oct. 26, 2015),
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both the House Committee on Rules and its Subcommittee on
185
Legislation and Budget Process. In addition, other Floridians
186
belonged to the House Committee on Rules. In all, three of the
twelve members of the Committee on Rules at this time hailed
187
from Florida. As described below, this committee played an
important role in securing passage of Section 203.
In December 2013, the Senate Budget Committee negotiated
188
the final deal with the House Budget Committee. Surely, the
respective chairs of each committee, as well as their senior
members, must have played significant roles in these negotiations.
Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) and Representative Paul Ryan (R-WI)
189
chaired their respective budget committees.
It is likely that
Senator Nelson, as a senior member of the budget committee, also
190
had significant input into the final budget compromise.
Significantly, Section 203, a minute part of the Bipartisan
Budget Bill, arose during an appropriations process under
191
dramatic pressure in the months preceding enactment.
On
September 10, 2013, prior to the start of budget negotiations,
which eventually stalled and caused a governmental shutdown
192
lasting from October 1–16, H.J.R. Res 59 was introduced and
193
later was passed on September 20, after a mere hour of debate.
On September 27, the Senate passed the resolution with one

http://www.billnelson.senate.gov/about-bill. This information was gathered
during the 114th Congress (Fall 2014).
185. Richard B. Nugent, MAPLIGHT.ORG, http://maplight.org/us-congress
/legislator/1421-richard-b-nugent (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
186. Press Release, House of Reps. Comm. on Rules, Sessions Welcomes Rules
Members for the 113th Congress (Jan. 4, 2013), https://rules.house.gov/pressrelease/sessions-welcomes-rules-members-113th-congress.
187. Id.
188. John Bresnahan & Jake Sherman, Budget Agreement Reached, POLITICO
(Dec. 10, 2013, 10:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/budget-dealupdate-patty-murray-paul-ryan-100960.html.
189. See Press Release, House of Reps. Comm. on the Budget, Murray and
Ryan Introduce Bipartisan Budget-Conference Agreement, (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://budget.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=364030.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 179–85.
191. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
192. See Jeanne Sahadi, Shutdown: What Happens Next, CNN: MONEY (Oct. 1,
2013, 1:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/01/news/economy/shutdownwhat-next.
193. 159 CONG. REC. H5787 (daily ed. Sep. 20, 2013) (Roll No. 478).
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amendment. Essentially, the Senate struck the House’s version,
195
replacing it with one containing minimal changes, a process that
was repeated until a stalemate was reached.
On October 17, 2013, an interim appropriations bill that
196
temporarily ended the shutdown passed. Finally, on December
10, 2013, the chairs of the Senate and House Budget Committees,
197
Murray and Ryan, announced their bipartisan agreement. This
stripped the extant language of H.J.R. Res. 59, and replaced it with
198
language reflecting the new budget deal. All that remained was a
199
formal vote.
On December 12, 2013, the House voted in favor of the bill by
200
a vote of 332–94. For the first time, this bill included Section 203
201
as enacted. The House considered and debated the Section for
merely seventy minutes, under restrictions of a special rule, House
202
Resolution 438, promulgated by the Committee on Rules. This
not only abbreviated the debate, but, more importantly, mandated
that H.J.R. Res. 59 be considered in the House “without
203
intervention of any point of order.” This foreclosed legislators
from having a vehicle through which to raise objections concerning
204
violations of rules, such as lack of germaneness.
With past efforts to restrict the DMF through traditional
205
legislative channels having failed, proponents of Section 203

194. 159 CONG. REC. S6992 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 2013) (Rollcall Vote No. 208
Leg.).
195. 159 CONG. REC. H5773 (daily ed. Sep. 20, 2013) (H.J. Res. 59).
196. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–46, 127 Stat. 558
(2013).
197. See Biography, Bill Nelson, supra note 184.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 159 CONG. REC. H8083 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2013) (Roll No. 640).
201. 159 CONG. REC. H8059 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2013).
202. See H.R. Res. 438, 113th Cong. (2013–14).
203. 159 CONG. REC. H7702 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2013); see also H.R. REP. NO.
113-290 (2012–14) (Conf. Rep.) (showing that, along partisan lines, the House
Rules Committee, whose members included four from the Florida delegation,
voted to report this rule to the full house (9-3 vote)); 159 CONG. REC H7715 (daily
ed. Dec. 12, 2013) (Roll No. 638) (noting that the House passed this rule, 226195).
204. See KAREN L. HAAS, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 114TH
CONGRESS, at 30 (Jan 6, 2015), http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf.
205. See Identity Theft and Tax Fraud Prevention Act of 2013, S. 676, 113th
Cong. (2013); see also Protect and Save Act of 2013, H.R. 295, 113th Cong. (2013);
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finally slipped their legislation in under the guise of the budget
bill. Representative Johnson attempted to take credit for the
enactment, announcing:
I introduced the Alexis Agin Identity Theft Protection Act
with my Democrat colleague Xavier Becerra. And thanks
to the budget deal, which includes a provision to restrict
access to the Death Master File, American families will be
better protected from tax fraud. I salute the Agins for
206
their tireless advocacy, and God bless America.
Senator Nelson added that he had also been trying for several
207
years to limit access to the DMF, emphasizing that the measure
would “save the U.S. government money that otherwise is being
stolen;” the money anticipated to be salvaged was estimated at $786
208
million during the following decade. Omitted from this report
was the fact that $517 million of this savings would be derived from
a costly certification program for those seeking access to the
209
Limited Use Death Master File (LUDMF). With Section 203 set to
210
save only $269 million over the next decade, a fair inference can
be made that the actual intent behind Section 203 was to help
211
supplant budget cuts Congress enacted in 2011, not to fight
identity fraud.
In short, Section 203 provided that beginning March 26, 2014,
for three calendar years following a person’s death, all but those

Social Security Death Master File Privacy Act of 2013, H.R. 466, 113th Cong.
(2013); Tax Crimes and Identity Theft Prevention Act, H.R. 531, 113th Cong.
(2013).
206. 159 CONG. REC. H7699 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2013).
207. Rubin, Death List Limits, supra note 63.
208. Id.
209. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE (2013),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/costestimate
/bipartisan-budget-act-20130.pdf; see also Lori Montgomery, Senate Passes Bipartisan
Budget Agreement, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/senate-poised-to-pass-bipartisan-budget-agreement/2013/12/18
/54fd3a1a-6807-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html?hpid=z1; infra Section III.A
(describing certification process).
210. Brad Plumer, Here’s What’s in the Budget Deal the Senate’s Voting On, WASH.
POST (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/wp/2013/12/17/heres-whats-in-the-budget-deal-the-senates-voting-on/.
211. See Gregory Korte, “Death Master File” Remains Fodder for Scams, USA TODAY
(Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/02 /06/antifraud-efforts-stalled-as-death-master-file-lives-on/5231223/.
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certified by the DOC would be unable to access the DMF,
delayed access to the DMF for many by nearly four years.
A.

212

causing

Key Aspects of Section 203

Section 203 remains one of the few accomplishments of the
213
113th Congress. Section 203(a) restricts access to the DMF for
three calendar years, beginning on the date of an individual’s
death, to individuals certified under a program established by the
214
Secretary of Commerce. Thus, genealogical websites that had
posted the SSDI can no longer do so for deaths occurring on or
215
after March 26, 2014. Section 203 imposes user fees, as well as
penalties of $1,000 per unauthorized disclosure and fines reaching
216
$250,000.
B.

Concerns Raised about Section 203

Section 203 was drafted hastily, without the benefit of either
217
public hearings or full committee discussions. The result reflects
this lack of orderly process. Senator Nelson insisted that Section
203 be included in the November 2013 discussion draft “as is,”
likely because it became evident that it “was in contention to be a
part of the budget compromise, so they hurried to get some text
218
for the budget compromisers to use.”
Because the regular
219
the drafters
legislative drafting procedure was bypassed,
apparently did not appreciate the bill’s unintended consequences
to the public, medical and genealogical researchers, states,
financial institutions, insurance companies, and others. While
Section 203 was being developed, stakeholders were neither

212. See 42 U.S.C. § 1306(f) (2014).
213. See supra note 4.
214. Those receiving certification are granted access to the Limited Use Death
Master File (LUDMF). See Mathews, RPAC 2013 Year-End Report, supra note 97.
215. Ancestry.com now limits access to SSNs to 10 years following death. Why
Is the SSDI Data Publicly Available Online?, ANCESTRY (Oct. 5, 2015, 4:57 PM),
http://help.ancestry.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/593/kw/death%20master%2
0file.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1306(c) (2014).
217. E-mail from Barbara J. Mathews, Certified Genealogist, Bd. For
Certification of Genealogists, to author (Oct. 8, 2014) (on file with author).
218. Id.
219. See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing Senate colloquies).
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notified of its wording nor afforded opportunities to suggest
revisions. In fact, prior to the vote:
The Senate Finance Committee scheduled a hearing,
cancelled it for snow, rescheduled it, and cancelled it
again. The Finance Committee Chair released his staff’s
notes about what they might put in the bill. The Ranking
Member of the Finance Committee . . . released a
statement that this was not agreed-upon text. (Both
statements appear to have been removed from the
Finance Committee [web] page.) One week later, there
still had not been a hearing, but the Finance Committee’s
text turned up as Section 203 of the Ryan-Murray Budget
Conference Committee’s compromise. Section 203 had
bypassed committee hearings and public feedback; it
220
lacked committee approval.
While genealogists’ concerns about lack of input had little
effect on the legislative process, it seems that, shortly prior to the
vote, insurance companies and state administrators learned of the
details and raised concerns; from the colloquies in the
Congressional Record in the days preceding the vote, it became
clear that these stakeholders’ concerns were appreciated by the
221
legislators, who on the floor of Congress, asked for reassurance
that DMF access would not be unnecessarily curtailed upon
enactment.
1. Legislators’ Concerns
The following excerpts from the Congressional Record
highlight the frustrations of many concerning the legislative
process engaged in developing the Bipartisan Budget Bill generally,
and Section 203 specifically.
On December 17, the day before the vote, Senator Enzi from
Wyoming addressed the Senate:
Mr. President, I rise to express my disappointment that
the budget deal we will soon be voting on reflects just
that, a deal—not legislation, a deal.
....

220. Mathews, RPAC 2013 Year-End Report, supra note 97; see also Martinez,
supra note 17, at 557 n.25 (“[I]t does not help that legislators conduct the people’s
business by primarily consulting each other rather than their constituents.”).
221. See infra Section III.B (discussing colloquies of legislators).
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Because Members are going to be voting on a deal rather
than a bill that had the opportunity to be improved
through the committee process with feedback from other
Members, we will not have the opportunity to discuss the
potential unintended consequences and address them
before they become law. . . . I am on that conference
committee. When the deal was made, we read about it in
the papers just like everybody else. We did not get any
special notice that there had been a deal made . . . . I have
seen the deals made before. I have never seen one made
by so few people before. In this one there was a Democrat
from the Senate and a Republican from the House. The
two of them came up with a conclusion that this is what
we should have.
That is not too bad, provided it goes through a normal
process, which means we get to make some amendments.
When we make amendments, . . . at least we get to bring
up the unintended consequences. . . . That is why we have
so many people in Congress . . . a whole lot of
backgrounds looking at everything that happens . . . from
a whole lot of perspectives so maybe we can stop the
unintended consequences.
But that is only if it goes through a normal process. So far
the tree is filled on this bill. . . . That means no
amendments allowed. Take it or leave it. No matter what
you think of it, forget it. We are going to have some
unintended consequences . . . and they are going to
become law.
I applaud the proposal that would limit access to Social
Security’s Death Master File to prevent identity theft, and
individuals from fraudulently claiming government
benefits and tax refunds associated with those who have
passed away. . . . However, I am concerned that certain
organizations that use that same Death Master File for
legitimate business purposes that benefit consumers may
have their access restricted.
If we discussed these issues in committee, we might have
been able to address them, perhaps with a sensible
solution, perhaps in a way that would have protected the
identity and still protected the benefits to the consumer.
....
A few of the concerns I have just raised could be
addressed, if not in committee, then on the Senate floor.
Once again, the majority leader has decided that no
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amendments will be allowed. They won’t be allowed to be
offered, and they won’t be allowed to be voted on.
....
We have to stop dealmaking [sic] and we have to start
legislating.
Our constituents sent us here to legislate. They deserve
better than a deal agreed to behind closed doors without
input and improvements from the rest of the legislators,
not even the committee to which it was assigned. Even
though I am disappointed in the process that has led to
this point today, I am even more disappointed in the
222
product that resulted from the dealmaking [sic].
Senator Nelson responded:
It was never the intent of this Senator or the cosponsors to
deny access to the master file by the people who need it
for legitimate purposes. The language in this budget deal
would include the [DMF] file in the Freedom of
Information Act exemptions so that it will not be available
to just anyone off the street. However, the Social Security
Administration and Commerce would still be able to
223
release the information in the file for those who need it.
When Senator Nelson asked Senator Murray whether, “as
Commerce sets up a certification program, the Social Security
Administration and Commerce will still be able to release the
Death Master File to folks who need to use it for legitimate
224
purposes,” Senator Murray responded: “That is absolutely our
intention. There is nothing in law that prevents the continued
public release of the Death Master File while the Commerce
Department sets up the certification program. This act simply
exempts the Social Security Administration’s death records from
225
freedom of information requests . . . .”
Senator Casey offered the following:
Mr. President, echoing the comments of my colleague
from Florida, I am pleased that the budget includes
language to address the fraud that is perpetrated with
information from the Death Master File. Tax fraud is a
large and growing problem. . . .
222.
Enzi).
223.
224.
225.

159 CONG. REC. S8875–76 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2013) (statement of Sen.
Id. at S8891 (statement of Sen. Nelson).
Id.
Id. (statement of Sen. Murray).
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As a member of the Finance Committee, I have
worked . . . to address this issue. I am pleased to see the
language limiting access to the Death Master File in the
budget deal.
As Commerce begins its rulemaking, it is essential to
strike the correct balance. The reality is that the Death
Master File is used by companies across Pennsylvania and
the Nation to prevent fraud and provide other essential
consumer protections. Banks, investment companies,
insurers, and numerous other businesses run this file to
ensure the identity of those accessing their services.
Striking the correct balance in the regulatory process is
critical to ensuring the continued legitimate use of this
information.
Businesses and those who contract for assistance with
fraud prevention . . . must maintain access to the file.
Furthermore, access must remain available as those
regulations are promulgated.
In short, as a certification program is set up, it is
important that we get it right. The Death Master File is
critical to fraud prevention and must remain available to
legitimate users. To that point, I ask the Senator from
Washington, the distinguished chairwoman, is it the
intention of the Bipartisan Budget Act for the Commerce
Department to seek input from stakeholders as it creates
the certification program to ensure legitimate users
226
maintain access to the file?
Senator Murray then reassured Senator Casey that standard
rulemaking procedures would be followed in establishing the
227
certification program.
Senator Orin Hatch shared his significant concerns:
Mr. President, I have decided to support the budget
agreement, though . . . it contains some imperfections.
Following up on earlier remarks today in a colloquy on
the Senate floor by my colleagues from Florida,
Pennsylvania, and the Senate Budget Committee Chair,
Senator Murray, I wish to provide some instructive
remarks about the Death Master File provision of the
budget agreement. . . . Many researchers, genealogists,
and businesses use the data for bona fide reasons
including fraud prevention, ancestry research, identifying
226.
227.

Id. (statement of Sen. Casey).
Id. (statement of Sen. Murray).
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remains of deceased individuals, retirement plan
administration and prevention of improper payments. As
long as they can show the Commerce Department that
they have rigorous privacy protections and protocols put
in place, they should be able to become certified by
Commerce to have access to the Death Master File data.
I concur with what much of what my colleagues have said
in their recent colloquy about the Death Master File
provision of the budget agreement. . . . [I] wish to
reiterate the need for balance in the regulatory process
and in the rulemaking procedures . . . in the budget
legislation to undertake. We need a robust rule- making
process, where all interested parties are afforded the time
and
opportunity
to
adequately
express
their
interests. . . . [W]e need to ensure that during that
process, there will be access to Death Master File data for
bona fide purposes, including fraud prevention,
identifying remains of deceased individuals, forensic and
other genealogical research, prevention of improper
payments, and assurance of proper payments.
As the budget agreement is currently written, there
appears to be some confusion and ambiguity concerning
implementation of the regulatory process and rulemaking
procedures that the Commerce Department is to
undertake and whether access to data in the interim,
when rules are being promulgated and aired, will be
assured. . . . [A] more robust and inclusive process for
arriving at the Death Master File provision of the budget
agreement could have eliminated the confusion and
ambiguity that has arisen. The Finance Committee . . . has
jurisdiction over the manner in which the Social Security
Administration governs Death Master File data, and the
Finance Committee has expertise that could have been
called upon. Unfortunately, that was not the case, as the
Death Master File provision of the budget agreement was
not processed through regular order with adequate
228
Finance Committee input.
Senator Hatch continued to express frustration with the legislative
process:
Mr. President, it is becoming far too common for
important legislation to bypass committees of jurisdiction
and for it to be written by legislators who do not
228.

Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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necessarily have the depth of knowledge and expertise
necessary to avoid writing laws that either do not work or
229
contain glitches, ambiguities, and confusing language.
In my opinion, we need to return to regular order where
committees of jurisdiction are the places where issues in
their jurisdiction are debated, processed, and agreed
upon in a bipartisan fashion. Certainly, committees of
jurisdiction must be consulted when others decide to
write legislation that involves issues that lie squarely within
their jurisdictions. That will be the surest route to
preventing a reoccurrence of the ambiguity and
confusion that has, unfortunately, arisen from the Death
230
Master File provision of the budget agreement.
The following day of the vote, Senator Edward Markey echoed
Senator Hatch’s concerns about implementation and fears of
insurance companies and pension administrators, both of which
use the DMF to determine the appropriate timing of benefits
231
payments. He emphasized that “nine states actually require that
insurers access the DMF prior to the payment of benefits,” and that
state treasurers and comptrollers also rely on the DMF daily, so
ongoing DMF access was critical and must continue uninterrupted
232
while the certification process was being instituted.
Senator
Markey concluded:
I . . . urge the Department of Commerce to take
immediate regulatory action to ensure that insurance
companies, pension plans, and State Treasurers and
Comptrollers’ access to the DMF is not inhibited during
the initiation of the certification program and that all
parties have an opportunity to obtain certification prior to
losing access to the DMF. The Department of Commerce
should also ensure that stakeholders, both in the industry
and in the beneficiary communities, have an opportunity
to provide input on any rulemakings regarding either the
certification program or the access restrictions
233
themselves.
229. Rubin, Death List Limits, supra note 63 (highlighting Senator Hatch’s
concerns).
230. Id.
231. 159 CONG. REC. S8946 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2013) (statement of Sen.
Markey).
232. Id.
233. 159 CONG. REC. S8920 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2013) (statement of Sen.
Markey). Senator Blumenthal’s remarks reiterated the comments of the other

9. Scharf (791-863) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

5/2/2016 9:52 PM

THE PROBLEM OF APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS

831

The press noticed the quantity and gravity of these concerns:
“In the Senate yesterday, Nelson, . . . Patty Murray and . . . Bob
Casey said the government shouldn’t interpret the law to cut off
access [to the DMF] immediately. ‘It’s essential to strike the correct
balance,’ Casey said, adding that banks and investment companies
234
in his state use the information.”
2. Adverse Consequences
For a law whose necessity seems debatable—the 2014 Treasury
Department Inspector General’s Interim Report indicates that, as
the IRS started to more carefully screen filings prior to Section
203’s enactment, fewer fraudulent tax refunds have been
235
detected —considerable adverse consequences have ensued.
a.

To the Public DMF

Section 203(a) prohibits disclosure of information during the
three-year period beginning on the date of an individual’s death.
Thus, a death occurring even as early as January 2015 will not
appear in the SSDI until January 2019, causing the three-year
information embargo to essentially last four years. The
considerable effect of this delay was calculated by Barbara Mathews
in her blog post, How Many Deaths before the SSDI gets Updated
236
Again. The last time the SSDI could legally be updated was March
28, 2014; the next will be January 1, 2018 for 2014 deaths—forty-

Senators concerning safeguarding PII, and reassured his constituents, including
businesses, that he did not want legitimate DMF users to be adversely affected
pending the certification program’s implementation. Id. Other senators echoed
these concerns about the states, stakeholders, and ensuring uninterrupted DMF
access. See 159 CONG. REC. S8920 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2013).
234. Rubin, Death List Limits, supra note 63.
235. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INTERIM RESULTS OF THE 2014
FILING
SEASON
11
(2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports
/2014reports/201440029_oa_highlights.pdf (“According to the IRS, expanded use
of controls to identify fraudulent claims before they are accepted . . . identified
555,235 fraudulent ones as of February 28, 2014.”).
236. Barbara J. Mathews, How Many Deaths Before the SSDI Gets Updated Again?,
MGC SENTINEL (Nov. 3, 2014), http://massgencouncil.org/index.php/easyblog
/entry/how-many-deaths-before-the-ssdi-gets-updated-again.
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five months later. During that time, there will have been 9.4
238
million more deaths in the U.S.
Rather than this lengthy embargo, the law could have been
sunset a few years following enactment, affording the IRS time to
make necessary adjustments that for years, aware of the fraud
issues, it did not.
b.

To Long-Term Users of the Public DMF

Long-term Public DMF users have experienced serious
restrictions in their abilities to conduct research. Recent additional
239
decreases in the materials in the Public DMF have caused a
decrease of seven million searchable records. In addition, as
Kenneth H. Ryesky explained, the high cost of the certification
process means it will be too expensive for many genealogists,
240
whether professional or amateur. Also, the new “Open DMF”
does not contain the decedents’ last addresses, and researchers
need to know ahead of time what information, including SSNs,
241
they are searching for.
“Wouldn’t it be simpler,” Ryesky, a
genealogist, added, “for the IRS to just screen its tax returns before
242
cutting the refund checks?”
In addition to these professional researchers, Section 203 also
adversely affects millions of individual genealogy researchers, who
are excluded from certification. This is due to the requirement that
the applicant’s interest in the information be either for a legitimate
243
fraud prevention or a business purpose.
Further, applicants must maintain appropriate “systems,
facilities, and procedures . . . to safeguard such information,” and
must have “experience in maintaining . . . confidentiality [and]

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
240. E-mail from Kenneth H. Ryesky to author (Apr. 20, 2014) (on file with
author).
241. Id. “Some refer to the publicly available DMF as the ‘Open DMF.’” Id. For
a review of experiences using the LUDMF, see supra notes 213–22 and
accompanying text.
242. E-mail from Kenneth H. Ryesky to author (Apr. 20, 2014) (on file with
author).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 1306(b)(2)(A) (2014); see also 15 C.F.R. § 1101 (2014)
(interim regulations).
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244

security,” a requirement that effectively eliminates individual
researchers from certification.
While professional genealogists may be disappointed that the
interim (and likely final) regulations will not automatically grant
245
them certification, certification itself has led to considerable
disappointment.
Forensic genealogist Dee Dee King, likely the first genealogist
246
to obtain certification under the interim regulations, described
her experiences in both attaining certification and in using the
247
LUDMF. A member of the Council for Advancement of Forensic
Genealogy, King was working for the Department of Defense to
248
help identify and repatriate military personnel remains. She
describes completing the detailed application as a time-consuming
249
and frustrating process. She found the product expensive for a
small business owner, ranging from $995 for a single user’s online
interactive annual subscription to $14,500 for fifty-one or more
registered users, with queries “priced by the number of inquiries,
250
ranging . . . from $600 packages to $14,400 packages.” Further,
research capabilities were limited: database fields are limited to
251
SSN, first name, last name, date of birth, and date of death. In

244. 42 U.S.C. § 1306(b)(2)(B) (2014).
245. Professional genealogists suggested the law permit certain categories of
individuals to have immediate access if they are certified by the U.S. Department
of Commerce. Barbara J. Mathews, RPAC Report, January 2014, BOARD FOR
CERTIFICATION GENEALOGISTS: SPRINGBOARD (Feb. 1, 2014), http://bcgcertification
.org/blog/2014/02/rpac-report-january-2014. The request was ignored. The
suggested exceptions included those assisting in military repatriation, identifying
unidentified decedents, assisting attorneys in finding missing heirs, researching
genetically-inherited diseases and locating family members, and working as
forensic/heir researchers and certified/accredited genealogists. See supra text
accompanying note 31.
246. Forensic Genealogy Services, LLC, About Us, http://www
.forensicgenealogyservices.com/AboutUs.html
(providing
background
information on Dee Dee King) (last visited Jan. 14, 2016); see Temporary
Certification Program for Access to the Death Master File, 79 Fed. Reg. 16668,
16668–72 (Mar. 26, 2014) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 1110).
247. See Dee Dee King, Demystifying the DMF, COUNCIL FOR ENACTMENT
FORENSIC GENEALOGY (Apr. 2014), http://www.forensicgenealogists.org/wpcontent/uploads/CAFG_Vol_4_Issue_3_DMF-Special.pdf.
248. See id. at 7.
249. See id. at 7–9.
250. Id. at 8.
251. Id. at 9.
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the name search fields, neither middle names nor initials are
permitted, a “primitive [search process] compared to some of the
252
current SSDI search forms offered by third parties.” Wildcard
253
254
searches do not work: “names must be exact.” Attempts to identify
people with a common first name or last name or both produced
only a few “hits,” whereas with other online products, far more
255
results are obtained.
King concluded that the DMF had
undergone a radical change since Section 203’s enactment,
contained considerably less information, and was expensive “for a
less useful product than many already online,” particularly if the
256
purpose is strictly for genealogical research. “The search engine
is primitive and appears to be designed for basic verification of
facts one already knows . . . . This is NOT a tool for
257
258
researching . . .” or producing “a broader set of information.”
She opined, “The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 did not kill our
ability to use the DMF. It did, however, certainly cripple the ability
to access the information, the amount of information available, and
259
the ability to mine the database.”
IV. CHALLENGING “BUSINESS AS USUAL” IN LEGISLATING
The process of enacting Section 203 perpetuates a dangerous
practice that will exacerbate the public’s mistrust in government

252. Id. at 10.
253. Wildcard Character, WHATIS.COM, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition
/wildcard-character (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (“A wildcard character is a special
character that represents one or more other characters. The most commonly used
wildcard characters are the asterisk (*), which typically represents zero or more
characters in a string of characters, and the question mark (?), which typically
represents any one character.”).
254. King, supra note 247, at 10.
255. See id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 10–11.
258. Id. at 11.
259. Id. at 11; see also Jan Meisels Allen, What Does IRS Tax Fraud Have to Do with
Genealogists? Nothing but We Have Been Blamed, IAJGS (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://lists.iajgs.org/mailman/private/records-access-alerts/msg00223.html. For
additional information regarding the inadequate and degraded data and search
engine, see Frederick E. Moss, Response to Proposed Final Rule: Certification Program
for Access to the Death Master File, FEDERATION GENEALOGICAL SOCIETIES 1, 9 (Mar. 30,
2015), http://www.fgs.org/rpac/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/FGS-Response-toproposed-Final-Rule-30-March-2015.pdf.
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260

and lack of faith in the democratic process. Notably, a recent
Gallup Poll found that “only 7 percent of Americans have ‘quite a
lot’ or a ‘great deal’ of confidence in the country’s legislative
branch,” representing the lowest confidence rate for Congress that
Gallup has ever recorded in its more than forty-year history and
represents a sharp drop from the first poll taken, in 1973, finding
261
forty-two percent of Americans confident in Congress.
This
skepticism is unlikely to recede so long as Congress continues to
bypass the expertise of legislators; the “take it or leave it” attitude
detailed in the colloquies of many senators prior to this enactment
262
evidences the damage caused by current legislative habits. That
these cynical maneuvers endure was plain during the fall of 2014,
when Congress authorized the President to engage in military
263
264
action in Syria with scant congressional debate.
260. Lauren Fox, Poll: Congressional Popularity Tanks, U.S. News & World Rep.
(June 19, 2014, 10:19 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/ballot-2014
/2014/06/19/poll-congressional-popularity-tanks.
261. Id.
262. Editorial, Don’t Hide the Syrian Aid Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/opinion/dont-hide-the-syrian-aidvote.html.
263. The Continuing Appropriations Resolution was the bill that kept the
government operating through mid-December. See H.R.J Res. 124, 113th Cong.
(2014) (enacted). Like the 2013 Act, it was used as the “vehicle for a major foreign
policy decision: arming and training Syrian rebels to fight against the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria . . . .” Editorial, supra note 262. The war resolution amended the
spending bill, pressing lawmakers to decide “between paying for the rebels and
shutting down the government.” Id. Widespread opposition arose in Congress. See
Paul Kane, House Moving Toward Vote on Syria Amendment, WASH. POST (Sept. 12,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpostcom/news/post-politics/wp/2014/09/12
/house-moving-toward-vote-on-syria-amendment. The bill passed on September
16. See Jonathan Weisman, House Votes to Authorize Aid to Syrian Rebels in ISIS Fight,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/politics/housevote-isis.html. Like Section 203, the aid was buried “inside an emergency spending
bill so that its members [wouldn’t] have to be held accountable.” David Firestone,
Will Congress Bother to Debate War Against ISIS?, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Sept. 17,
2014,
10:33
AM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/willcongress-bother-to-debate-war-against-isis/?partner=rss&emc=rss. This action was
not “surprising for a Congress that ha[d] spent years avoiding big votes, but [it
was] a pretty shameful abdication of one of the legislature’s most profound
obligations as the branch of government that declares war.” Id.
264. The co-chair of the seventy-member Congressional Progressive Caucus
objected. See Greg Sargent, Congress May Vote on War, After All (Sort of), WASH. POST:
THE PLUM LINE (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/2014/09/12/congress-may-vote-on-war-after-all-sort-of (“Attaching the
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A. Section 203 Represents Creeping Congressional Constraint of Core
Democratic Principles
Using appropriations measures to legislate is, arguably, antidemocratic. When Congress inserts substantive provisions into
appropriations bills, it thwarts the long-established process of
legislative democracy and threatens to undermine and erodes
265
public confidence in the federal government.

money for Syria to the continuing resolution forces members of Congress to make
a false choice: arm the Syrian rebels or shut down the government. These two
issues should be separate. The public must have their voices heard . . . in a full and
robust debate . . . .”). The Senate’s vote, which “sidestep[ped] the debate over the
extent of American military action until the lame-duck session of Congress” was
approved seventy-eight to twenty-two. Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters,
Congress Gives Final Approval to Aid Rebels in Fight With ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/world/middleeast/senate-approvesisis-bill-avoiding-bigger-war-debate.html; see also David Firestone, The Senate Ducks a
Clear Vote on Aid for Syrian Rebels, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Sept. 18, 2014, 7:05
PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/the-senate-ducks-a-clearvote-on-aid-for-syrian-rebels/ (“Most voters will never know whether their senator
approved the rebel aid out of principle, or to prevent a government shutdown.
And that ambiguity is just the way that most senators who are up for re-election in
November wanted it. . . . [T]hey ducked the issue and fled the Capitol. Firestone
quotes Senator Rand Paul, “[i]t’s inexcusable that the debate over whether we
involve a country in war . . . would be debated as part of a spending bill and not as
part of an independent, free-standing bill.” Id. (Firestone notes that this is not
surprising coming from “one of the least productive Congresses in history”). This,
from “one of the least productive Congresses in history . . . .” Note the frustration
of Massachusetts Congresswoman Tsongas: “We just simply have not had the
opportunity to robustly debate the President’s strategy. . . . I did vote against it
because . . . I just felt we needed to have a chance to debate the . . . strategy and an
opportunity to vote to authorize or not . . . .” Congresswoman Niki Tsongas: President
Obama “Needs a Congressional Vote” on Action Against ISIS, BOS. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 21,
2014,
3:09
PM),
http://wgbhnews.org/post/congresswoman-niki-tsongaspresident-obama-needs-congressional-vote-action-against-isis. On the lack of
legislative involvement in the war effort, see the comments of Massachusetts
Representative Jim McGovern suggesting that if Congress fails to take up the issue
next year, he would “introduce a ‘privileged resolution’ to force a vote.” Bryan
Bender, A Quest for Clarity: Massachusetts Delegation Says a Congressional Debate on War
With Islamic State Is Overdue, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 19, 2014, at E7 (“‘We are not living
up to our constitutional responsibility and we are getting sucked deeper and
deeper into a war that hasn’t been authorized’. . . .”).
265. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 369, 408–09 (1989) [hereinafter Rubin, Law and Legislation]
(“[L]egislation must be fair . . . . [L]egislation should be effective, [and] it should
achieve the purpose for which it was designed . . . . [T]he conception of fairness is
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Not only does legislating through appropriations riders violate
both House and Senate rules, but the frequent legislative
266
enactments using the appropriations process are problematic for
other reasons: (1) substantive legal changes made through
appropriations receive scant deliberation; (2) policymaking
through appropriations alters the balance of power by giving
undue advantage to last-minute, less-considered legislation; (3)
appropriations riders enact substantive laws that would otherwise
likely fail to survive conventional legislative channels; and (4)
appropriations riders interfere with the President’s constitutional
authority to veto problematic legislation, given that the President is
267
unable to reject specific spending propositions.
Inclusion of substantive legislation in appropriations bills
breaches both House Rule XXI and Senate Rule XVI. House Rule
XXI states, “[a] provision changing existing law may not be
268
reported in a general appropriation bill.” Furthermore, this rule
requires that “[a]n amendment to a general appropriation bill shall
269
not be in order if changing existing law.” Senate Rule XVI also
requires that “[n]o amendments shall be received to any general
appropriation bill the effect of which will be to . . . add a new item
of appropriation, unless it be made to carry out the provisions of
270
some existing law.” The fourth clause provides, “[o]n a point of
order made by any Senator, no amendment offered by any other
Senator which proposes general legislation shall be received to any
that the government must take positive action to change social
conditions . . . . Legislation is the mechanism by which these positive norms of
fairness are implemented; if we cannot legislate effectively, we shall fail to produce
a regime that we regard as just.”); see also Martinez, supra note 17, at 552–55.
266. E.g., H.R.J. Res. 124, 113th Cong., 128 Stat. 1867 (2014) (training Syrian
rebels); Department of Defense and Full-year Continuing Appropriations Act of
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1713, 125 Stat. 38, 150 (2011); see also MARK CHAMPOUX
& DAN SULLIVAN, AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS: A DISTINCTION WITHOUT
DIFFERENCE? (2006), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/auth_appro
_15.pdf.
267. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Salazar, Congress
Behaving Badly, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 351, 394–96 (2014).
268. KAREN L. HAAS, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 114TH
CONGRESS, XXI cl. 2(b), (Jan. 6, 2015), http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/houserules.pdf.
269. Id. at cl. 2(c).
270. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., RULES OF THE SENATE, XVI, cl. 1 (Jan. 24,
2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-113sdoc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18
.pdf
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general appropriation bill, nor shall any amendment not germane
or relevant to the subject matter contained in the bill be
271
received.”
Notwithstanding these rules, which are intended to resist the
effective interests and opacity that permeate the appropriations
272
process,
appropriations bills often contain substantive
273
Harvard law students Mark Champoux and Dan
provisions.
Sullivan note that “[s]ometimes these provisions enact entire laws
while other times they simply implement a single policy
274
objective.” This strategy of tacking legislative provisions onto
275
appropriations bills has become a “favorite tool” of Congress,
276
inhibiting public participation and legislative accountability.

271. Id.
272. Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 387. This means of legislating remains alive,
evidenced by the 2014 Bipartisan Budget Bill, approved December 2014, under
pressure to forestall a government shutdown. See Jennifer Epstein, Barack Obama
Signs Budget Bill, POLITICO (Dec. 26, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://www
.politico.com/story/2013/12/president-barac-obama-signs-budget-bill-bipartisanbudget-act-101551.html; see also H.R. 59, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). The bill is
“also packed with policy add-ons known as riders, many of which couldn’t get
through Congress on their own. The riders include provisions affecting pension
plans, bank investments, school lunches, trucking safety, marijuana sales, and even
old-fashioned light bulbs.” Charles Babington, Spending Deal May Not Signal More
Compromise in 2015 Congress, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www
.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/12/15/spending-deal-may-not-signal-morecompromise-congress/UFtPWDLM8OXVCV2k14tweP/story.html. For example,
the spending bill “loosens some banking rules imposed after the 2008 financial
crisis. . . . [and] [a]llows some pension plans to cut benefits promised to current
and future retirees.” Id. Even trucking safety rules were rolled back, prompting
industry opposition. Id. Like the budget bill of 2013, it was a “must-pass.” Id.; see
Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 387 (“This rule rests on the recognition that the
appropriation process is dominated by well-organized interests and lacks
visibility.”); see also Noah Bierman, Spending Bill Had No Fans in Mass. Delegation,
BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics
/2014/12/16/massachusetts-congressional-delegation-opposes-spending-bill-eventhough-will-fund-some-their-projects/MXuK4knpBuCfr1TTp7Wx3M/story.html.
273. See Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 386 (“House and Senate rules prohibit
the attachment of substantive legislation to appropriation bills, but Congress often
ignores this rule.”).
274. CHAMPOUX & SULLIVAN, supra note 266, at 17 (footnote omitted).
275. Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 457
(1997).
276. Id. at 500.
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The practice reverses the customary legislative process that
typically requires committee research, drafts, reviews, and
recommendations followed by floor debate and passage in each
277
legislative chamber. This process provides ample opportunity for
278
both public and legislative scrutiny. While these reviews do not
guarantee quality legislation, they do encourage public
involvement, deliberated policymaking, and transparency. As
Justice Brandeis once remarked: “Publicity is justly commended as
a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
279
policeman.”
Congressional rules and procedures, while not expressly
required by the Constitution, developed to ensure that policy issues
280
receive informed consideration. Despite being voluntary, these
rules, adopted by Congress as a means of self-governance, leave
each chamber free to amend, repeal, or waive them as they see
281
fit.
Congress has at least five means of enacting substantive
legislation through appropriations bills. It can:
(1) Not enforce its rules;
(2) Enact continuing resolutions not subject to the rules,
instead of a general appropriations bill;
(3) Insert
authorization
provisions
into
omnibus
appropriations acts;
(4) Legislate through appropriations bills by including
provisions restricting the use of funds; and
282
(5) Repeal or amend existing law by implication.
Section 203 invokes only the first of these measures—
Congress’s failure to enforce its own rules. Put simply, Congress
283
can elect not to enforce its own rules. Because points of order are
not self-executing, a member must raise them in order to enforce a
277. Id. For a description of dozens of interviews with congressional legislative
drafters about the drafting process, see Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 582–
624 (2002).
278. Zellmer, supra note 275, at 500.
279. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914).
280. See Zellmer, supra note 275, at 500–11.
281. See id. at 504–05.
282. CHAMPOUX & SULLIVAN, supra note 266, at 17–21.
283. Id. at 17.

9. Scharf (791-863) (Do Not Delete)

5/2/2016 9:52 PM

840

[Vol. 42:791

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW
284

rule. If no member raises a point of order, Congress passes a bill,
285
the President signs it, and it becomes law. In essence, Congress
sweeps the rule violation under the rug.
286
Legislators usually do not object to this practice. At times,
they pass ad hoc rules similar to those adopted during Section
287
203’s enactment, prohibiting points of order. They can even
avoid compliance with their own rules by simply waiving or
288
suspending them.
More significant to Section 203, the House commonly attaches
289
a “special rule” to appropriations bills under consideration. A
special rule outlines the procedures applicable during a bill’s
consideration and often waives points of order, including those
290
usually available under House Rule XXI; this enables Congress to
291
avoid implementing its appropriations rules when it sees fit.
Critiques of this method of legislating are common. In 1997,
Sandra Beth Zellmer described the “perils of enacting substantive
292
environmental legislation through the appropriations process.”
She highlighted that such use of substantive appropriations riders
determined “the outcome of public policy issues ranging from
293
abortion to oil development,” facilitating major changes in public
294
policy “without public input or legislative accountability.”

284.
285.

Id.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 24–38 (3d ed. 2001); see also U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2–3 (Presentment Clause).
286. Cf. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 17 n.1 (“[The] Rules
Committee . . . recommends to the full house a rule allowing expedited
consideration of important bills. . . . [T]he Majority Leader normally expedites
consideration by negotiating a unanimous consent agreement . . . .”).
287. See H.R. Res. 438, 113th Cong. § 10 (2013); see also supra Part II.
288. CHAMPOUX & SULLIVAN, supra note 266, at 7–8.
289. Id. at 8 (citing Louis Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in
Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 93–94 (1979)).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Zellmer, supra note 275, at 488.
293. Id. at 457.
294. Id.; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 387 (“Politics is not designed to
satisfy private interests . . . . The republican view advises politicians to view with
skepticism and subject interest group demands to examination through an open
deliberative process. Republican theories ‘require public-regarding justifications
offered after multiple points of view have been consulted and . . . understood.’”).
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Denunciations of the practice illuminate the need for reform;
notwithstanding the efficiency of riders in tying up loose ends,
critiques elucidate how the practice’s inadequate tolerance for
transparent debate creates a vehicle for enacting legislation that
“would likely not survive the scrutiny of . . . committees and full
296
floor debate.”
One common critique is that riders encourage “logrolling,”
wherein a bill incorporates inconsistent provisions, forcing passage
by uniting divergent interest groups when any one provision would
297
not pass on its own. Because legislators are often faced with
proposals containing inconsistent, or “logrolled,” sections, and
because these prospects sometimes occur under the threat of a
298
government shutdown,
incentive to oppose objectionable
substantive provisions in appropriations bills is scant.
While members of Congress are undoubtedly aware of these
practices, and of ongoing critiques of them, they have largely
299
acceded to the persistence of these practices. Notably, however,
300
there have been some attempts at reform. One significant effort
is found in the “Pork-Barrel Reduction Act,” proposed by Senator
301
John McCain in 2006, which would have amended Senate rules to
require sixty votes to defeat a point of order for either new

295. See Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 391 (“Lawmaking through
appropriations subverts the legislative process and results in the enactment of
special interest legislation. Prominent scholars and jurists have urged the courts to
remand . . . any legislation impinging on important values . . . enacted through
dubious legislative procedures. The Supreme Court has examined the legislative
process and invalidated laws not supported by adequate fact-finding. Judicial
enforcement of Congressional rules, which is less intrusive, will move Congress
towards ‘due process’ lawmaking.”); see also Zellmer, supra note 275, at 457–59.
296. Zellmer, supra note 275, at 457.
297. See Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 396 (citing Martin v. Zimmerman, 289
N.W. 662, 664 (Wis. 1940)); accord PHILLIP P. FRICKEY ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 250 (2006) (explaining justification for logrolling).
298. This occurred in the run-up to Section 203. See CHAMPOUX & SULLIVAN,
supra note 266, at 27 (citation omitted); see also supra notes 14, 188 and
accompanying text. For more, see Jackie Calmes, Demystifying the Fiscal Impasse That
Is Vexing Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A20; Andrew Kirell, A Brief
History of the 2013 Government Shutdown, MEDIAITE (Oct. 17, 2013, 11:19 AM),
http://www.mediaite.com/tv/a-brief-history-of-the-2013-government-shutdown/.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 278–80.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 293–96.
301. See S. Res. 2265, 109th Cong. (2006).
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302

legislation or unauthorized appropriations. It would also have
prohibited these actions through amendment or conference
303
304
report. The bill died in committee.
Appropriations riders threaten the integrity of democracy by
preventing public involvement and informed legislative debate on
305
critical issues. Zellmer warned that “[i]nadequate enforcement of
existing rules, a willingness to waive rules, and the growing use of
omnibus Continuing Resolutions in the appropriations process
allow substantive riders to flourish, undermining the goal of
306
deliberative government.” “This is particularly damaging,” she
added, “when the appropriations process is used to dictate complex
substantive issues . . . that would greatly benefit from the give and
307
take of the normal legislative process.”
Others have also noted the difficulties raised by appropriations
riders. Edward Fitzgerald recently warned of these “deficiencies in
308
the legislative process,” proposing both “judicial enforcement of
Congressional rules and heightened judicial scrutiny of special
interest legislation . . . to further an open deliberative legislative
309
process.” He did acknowledge that the Supreme Court had yet to
invalidate riders because of their enactment within appropriations
310
bills.
Additionally, notwithstanding the Court’s hesitancy to nullify
riders, it has recognized that congressional rules are legally
311
enforceable; hence, it has invalidated some acts that violated
312
congressional rules.
For example, in 1949 it reversed a perjury conviction on the
grounds that a required quorum was absent in the House
313
committee when the perjury was committed. Later, in a 1963 case
involving accusations of “un-American” activities, the Court, in
302. See id. at § 2.
303. See id.
304. See generally S. Res. 2265, 109th Cong. (2006), https://www.congress.gov
/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/2265/all-actions.
305. See Zellmer, supra note 275, at 503–04.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 504.
308. Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 352.
309. Id. at 354.
310. See id. at 387.
311. See id. at 392.
312. See id. at 392.
313. Id. (citing Cristoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 90 (1949)).
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314

Yellen v. United States,
confirmed that legislative rules are
“judicially cognizable,” and that legislative committees must adhere
to their own rules.
Significantly, the Court has recognized the key distinction
315
between legislative authorizations and appropriations. Unlike
legislative proposals, appropriation measures “have the limited and
specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs” and
316
“are not proposals for legislation.” “If appropriation bills were
used for substantive changes in legislation, it would lead to the
absurd result of requiring Congress to review exhaustively the
background of every authorization before voting on an
317
appropriation.”
Legislation such as Section 203, that waives internal rules,
subverts the traditional process of legislating, and encourages
members of Congress to ignore rules in favor of opaque methods
of legislating, threatens our polity. Attaching riders to
appropriations bills and circumventing the traditional legislative
process that occurs during committee hearings and debates on the
floors of the House and Senate diminishes both accountability and
communication between Congress, the citizenry, and the
democratic process.
The process leading to the enactment of Section 203 detailed
in Part II, which truncated the time-honored system of legislating,
318
should be curbed. That these maneuvers occur regularly should
give pause to government observers, who cannot be sanguine about
319
the public’s increasingly unenthusiastic view of it.
314. Yellen v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963) (declaring reversible
error the refusal to call executive session when rule required it); see also Fitzgerald,
supra note 267, at 392. For an example of the detriment to confidence in
government from breaches of agency rules, see Kay Lazar & Shelley Murphy,
Marijuana Licensing Went Awry Early On, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 28, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/massachusetts/2014/12/27/state-effortlicense-medical-marijuana-dispensaries-went-off-rails-fromstart/9UfRwaG7TpxtvTspkSFDkI/story.html (“‘Few things,’ [Judge] Billings
wrote, ‘erode public confidence in government like an agency’s disregard for its
own regulations, procedures, and policies.’”).
315. Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 393 (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.
347, 359–61 (1979)).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 393–94 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190
(1978)).
318. See supra Part II.
319. The problem is long-standing. See KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 17, at 441
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The judicial branch could help stem this growing tide of voter
cynicism by scrutinizing substantive appropriations; it has done so
320
recently with regard to other areas of law. Addressing these issues
is a proper exercise of the Court’s powers and would ensure, not
321
endanger, separation-of-powers principles. Such scrutiny would
ensure that new legislation reflects the democratic principles of
rationality and due process, stimulating confidence in government
in general, and the Court in particular, which could then take its
322
rightful place among the other branches of government. Clearly,
(“[I]n the midst of public opinion surveys showing enormous public disaffection
with Congress, the House and Senate agreed in 1992 to . . . study and make
recommendations for overhauling the institution.”). None of the proposals was
adopted. Id. “The belief that Congress . . . [is] not functioning property is widely
held.” Id. at 4. See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 907 (1987) (noting that, “[T]he work of some
legal scholars has begun to reflect this increasingly negative view of government.”
and that “[t]he real risk is . . . that special interest groups . . . will destroy the
credibility of the democratic ethos to the ordinary citizen. The notorious increases
in public cynicism over government, combined with concurrent declines in voter
turnout, suggest that this process may be underway already.”).
320. For a detailed account of the Supreme Court’s engagement with
immigration legislation, see Irene Scharf, Un-Torturing the Definition of Torture and
Employing the Rule of Immigration Lenity, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 14 n.70 (2013). For
additional examples, see infra Section III.B.1.a.
321. I am not alone in suggesting the Court scrutinize the legislative process.
See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative
Process, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1915, 1916 (2011); see also Rubin, Law and Legislation, supra
note 265, at 408–09 (“Legislation . . . must be fair and must not oppress private
persons. To some extent, this . . . is secured by judicial supervision of the
legislature. Such supervision is essential . . . if only because of our . . . belief that
no branch of government can adequately police itself.”); Michael J. Teter, Letting
Congress Vote: Judicial Review of Arbitrary Legislative Inaction, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1435,
1436 (2014) (encouraging increased judicial scrutiny of federal legislation);
Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The Rehnquist Court and the Power to “Say What the
Law Is”, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839, 840–41 (2002) (discussing the Rehnquist
Court’s assertion of its power under Marbury v. Madison to “say what the law is” visà-vis legislative enactments).
322. See Penny Starr, Flashback: Obama Praises 3 ‘Coequal Branches’ of Gov’t,
Preventing Tyranny, CNSNEWS.COM (Dec. 5, 2013, 4:03PM), http://cnsnews.com
/news/article/penny-starr/flashback-obama-praises-3-coequal-branches-gov-tpreventing-tyranny; see also Charles E. Hughes, The Court and Constitutional
Interpretation (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional
.aspx (“The Constitution of the United States is a carefully balanced document. It
is designed to provide for a national government sufficiently strong and
flexible . . . yet sufficiently limited and just to protect the guaranteed rights of
citizens; it permits a balance between society’s need for order and the individual’s
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the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the Constitution,
rather than bureaucratic protectionism, must be the main standard
against which to test legislation.
B.

Judicial Solutions to Issues Raised by Section 203’s Enactment—
Legisprudence

“Legisprudence,” the “analysis of statutes within the framework
323
of jurisprudential philosophies about the role and nature of law,”
could inspire improvements in the ways in which laws are enacted
so they more closely reflect principles underlying a democratic
form of government.
1. The Separation of Powers Doctrine Supports Scrutiny of the
Legislative Process
324

Contrary to the claims of some, Supreme Court scrutiny of
legislation does not violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine, but
rather is justified by the structure and nature of the Constitution.
The doctrine “can be traced to the Madisonian effort to mediate
the problem of faction—the influence of interest groups in the
325
political process,” given that “[t]he accumulation of all powers
legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of
one, a few or many . . . may justly be pronounced the very
326
definition of tyranny.”
The Constitution’s structural division
right to freedom. To assure these ends, the Framers . . . created three
independent and coequal branches of government.”).
323. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 559 (citing Julius Cohen, Towards
Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950)). Professor Turley calls
legisprudence “the study and interpretation of legislation.” Jonathan Turley, Seeing
Red and Blue: Critics Attack Judges in the DC and 4th Circuits over Health Care Rulings
(July 30, 2014), jonathanturley.org/2014/07/30/seeing-red-and-blue-critics-attackjudgges-in-the-dc-and-4th-circuits-over-health-care-rulings/ (discussing Obamacare
rulings from legisprudence lens).
324. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 319, at 874; see also MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6 (1999) (pressing for
elimination of judicial review).
325. Farber & Frickey, supra note 319, at 875.
326. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 324 (James E. Cooke ed., 1961) (James
Madison) (explaining the need to separate governmental powers as written by
James Madison); see also David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Partial Constitution or the Sunstein
Constitution? 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 306–07 (1994) (citation omitted)
(“[T]he power of Congress, the branch . . . the Founding Generation recognized
had
the
greatest
tendency
to
aggrandize
itself,
was
limited

9. Scharf (791-863) (Do Not Delete)

5/2/2016 9:52 PM

846

[Vol. 42:791

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

creates a precise design in its creation of the three branches, each
327
Within this structure,
deemed “co-equal” with the others.
explicitly vesting in the Supreme Court “[t]he judicial power of the
328
United States,” and extending it “to all Cases . . . arising under
329
this Constitution, [and] the laws of the United States,” lies the
assurance that the job of the Court is to review laws enacted by the
legislature to ensure that they comport with the Constitution. To
be sure, historically, the Court has hesitated to settle certain
controversies. However, Supreme Court jurisprudence has evolved,
with immigration cases being an example. In the early years, it
deferred to the other branches, but gradually, over the last century,
it has opined over controversies involving immigration
330
legislation. Likewise, the Court’s customary reluctance to decide
issues that might be considered legislative has developed over time,
with the Court deciding a wide range of issues, including national
331
332
health care, delegation of authority to the executive, veto
333
334
335
power, bills of attainder, and even gun control. Supreme
Court review of the ways in which federal laws are enacted is
particularly fitting in the current climate, as the legislative process
not only violates Congress’ rules, but also denies the public a
transparent view of its process.

through . . . enumerated powers: Article I . . . vests in the Congress only those
powers ‘herein granted.’”); Jeffrey Rosen, Opinion, Madison’s Privacy Blind Spot,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/opinion
/sunday/madisons-privacy-blind-spot.html?mtrref=www.google.com&assetType
=opinion (explaining that debates concerning the Bill of Rights indicate Madison
was more concerned with congressional abuses than executive ones). One can
infer that Madison would support Supreme Court oversight of Congress.
327. See Douglas E. Edlin, A Constitution Right to Judicial Review: Access to Courts
and Ouster Clauses in England and the United States, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 70 (2009).
328. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
329. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
330. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
331. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
332. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (showcasing an
early example of delegating authority).
333. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 920 (1983).
334. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965).
335. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (reviewing whether
Congress is following its own rules, or whether suspension by a house of its rules
might be reviewable, is different).
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Rationality and Due Process Principles Restrain the Legislative
Process
a.

Rational Legislating

336

and the Legislative Process

Injecting a measure of rationality into the legislative process
would likely enhance the quality of new laws. In the early years of
the nation, judges assumed the view, espoused by William
Blackstone, that statutes were irrational creations of legislators, and
337
thus inconsequential to the common law. Through the late
nineteenth century, judges believed themselves responsible for
maintaining a so-called “objective system of interpreting the
338
common law, coined ‘common law formalism.’”
Denounced by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes at the end of
339
the nineteenth century as being disconnected with the real world,
this formalistic approach was largely abandoned during the first
half of the twentieth century, inspired by the writings of Dean
Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and others who
founded the theories of “sociological jurisprudence” and legal
realism to underscore that case results are not inevitable, but
340
largely arise out of ideology. Thereafter, statutes began to replace
341
common law as “the source of policy, law, and even principle.”
During the 1930s through the 1960s, the Legal Realists postulated
that law mirrored social policy; accordingly, legislative analysis
342
should account for theories that were both legal and non-legal.
Dean Roscoe Pound boldly pronounced that judging mechanically,

336. The ensuing description is merely an abbreviated sketch. See Martinez,
supra note 17, for a more elaborate description of rational legislating.
337. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 407–43 (1765) (describing the
improvements of England Law and how the common law has “accumulated
wisdom of ages”).
338. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 561.
339. While simplistic, I think it captures his essence. See HOLMES, THE PATH OF
THE LAW 15 (1899); see also MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870–1960, 129–43 (1992); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 196–224 (1993).
340. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 562.
341. Id. at 561–62, 566.
342. For archetypical legal realism, see Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,
8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). Other theorists, including Brandeis and Frankfurter,
supplemented this view of the modern regulatory state. See LEONARD BAKER,
BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY, 492 (1984).
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as had been the case through the 1930s, was “stupid.” In the early
1940s, Lon Fuller, an idealist, suggested in his famous quotation
that, “in the moving world of law, the is and the ought are
344
inseparably linked.” Thus, “when law fails to fulfill worthy goals, it
345
falls short of being law . . . .” Emphasizing the centrality of the
346
“law’s relationship to democracy,” Fuller thought that what most
distinguished a democracy from a totalitarian society was the
347
former’s commitment to the free exchange of ideas. In the
citizens, Fuller believed, is where the “responsibility for the law”
348
lies.
Julius Cohen, in the 1950s, suggested that we broaden the
Realist critique to legislative conduct, acknowledging that, “judges
349
do not just find the law; they make it.” As “legislatures are the
paradigm ‘law makers,’ legislative conduct should be examined [by
350
courts] for rationality . . . .”
From the early 1940s through the 1970s, Legal Process Theory
ascended through the ideas of Herbert Wechsler, Lon Fuller,
Henry Hart, and Albert Sacks. These men advanced the notion that
the purpose of the law was to offer solutions to society’s
351
problems. Professor Tribe’s proposal in the 1970s, that legislative
conduct should be subject to judicial review, was his solution to the
352
problem of insufficient legislative process.
Given that the
Constitution requires legislative conduct to “take a certain form, to
343. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 566; see also Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 63 (1905).
344. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 566 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN
QUEST OF ITSELF 64 (1940)).
345. Id. at 567.
346. Id.
347. Id. (citing LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 122–23, 126
(1940)).
348. Id.
349. Martinez, supra note 17, at 572.
350. Id. at 573 (citation omitted) (“However, Cohen did not solve the manner
in which such ‘legisprudence’ should proceed. And . . . no one else has discussed
[it] either.”).
351. Id. at 571 (citing HENRY HART, JR., & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 148 (William Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip Frickey, eds., 1st ed. 1994)).
352. Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269
(1975); see also Victor Goldfeld, Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group
Politics: Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional
Processes, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 367, 372–73 (2004).
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353

follow a process . . . or to display a particular structure,” for Tribe,
constitutional structure—particularly the Due Process Clauses—
authorized this oversight.
To date, while some cases have reflected Tribe’s theory, these
have largely concerned issues of state sovereignty, not irrational
354
355
legislation.
For example, in Laney v. Fairview City,
which
involved a power line electrocution, the Utah Supreme Court
struck down a statute stripping Utah from liability, concluding that
its “immunization of all municipal activities was not justified by any
356
legislative investigation, findings, or relevant history.”
This
legislative scrutiny, while promising, is likely “far greater than
357
would be authorized by rational legislating requirements.” To be
sure, Section 203’s enactment compares favorably to that of Utah’s
law, given its exclusion of important stakeholders from the process
358
and the absence of legislative hearings. Were the Supreme Court
to scrutinize Section 203 from the vantage point of Laney v. Fairview
City, it would likely be struck down.
Back to legisprudence. Following Professor Tribe’s proposals,
Hans Linde, former justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, studied
359
the “problem of oversight of legislative conduct.” Like Cohen,
Linde considered the problem one of determining “‘rationality’ in
360
the legislative process.” Like Tribe, Linde noted the lack of
judicial review of legislative action, which he agreed was subject to
361
due process constraints. Linde cautioned, though, that existing
theory, which encouraged “judicially formulated and judicially

353. Tribe, supra note 352, at 291.
354. See, e.g., Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1007 (Utah 2002).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1026.
357. Martinez, supra note 17, at 587.
358. See supra Part III.
359. Martinez, supra note 17, at 574.
360. Id. at 574; see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 381 (noting that, to
Linde, “rational lawmaking” requires legislators to “inform themselves . . . about
the existing conditions on which the proposed law would operate, and about the
likelihood that the proposal would . . . further the intended purposes.”); Farber &
Frickey, supra note 319, at 877 (noting that recent Supreme Court cases affirm that
statutes should be invalidated when borne out of “legislative irrationality,” see
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434] (1982), or prejudice, see City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)]).
361. Martinez, supra note 17, at 574 (citation omitted).
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administered review of legislative conduct, . . . leaves the courts
362
vulnerable to a charge of institutional illegitimacy.”
In succeeding years, Legal Process Theory has been tested by
363
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars, who argue that, rather than
being an elaboration of legitimate legislative activity, law was
364
“rational, subjective, and political.” These scholars further argue
that, “the rule of law is not neutral; law subordinates the wills of
365
with rulings often
some citizens to the wills of others,”
illuminated through the lens of the court’s alignment with one
366
party over another. Legislators are part of this, too, as they have
become “excessively responsive to the monied [sic] and the well367
organized, to the detriment of groups already disadvantaged.”
While it seems that we remain too close, temporally, to this theory
368
to evaluate its lasting influence, it persists in public discourse. In
fact, one could view Section 203 as a classic example of this type of
legislation.
369
The Public Choice theorists soon moved CLS a step further,
suggesting that legislators, primarily concerned with reelection, are
actually immune to “efforts to improve their effectiveness in
370
achieving public purposes” or working in the public interest!
Though this theory is often raised in discussions of legal
scholarship about judicial interpretation and not legislative
371
process, it could be employed to challenge legislative efforts that
362. Id. at 574–75.
363. See Jonathan Turley, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought,
81 NW L. REV. 593, 595 (1987).
364. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 595.
365. Id. at 596.
366. Id. (discussing the court’s denial of a defense of necessity in an antinuclear protest case involving Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, State v.
Warshow, 138 Vt. 22 (1979)).
367. Id.
368. See generally DAVID CALLAHAN & J. MIJIN CHA, DEMOS, STACKED DECK: HOW
THE DOMINANCE OF POLITICS BY THE AFFLUENT & BUSINESS UNDERMINES ECONOMIC
MOBILITY IN AMERICA (2013),
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files
/imce/StackedDeck_1.pdf. But see Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the
U.S. Congress, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 89, 91 (1995) (arguing that “campaign
contributions of interest groups have far less influence than commonly thought”).
369. Public choice is “the application of economics to political science.”
Farber & Frickey, supra note 319, at 878 (quoting D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1
(1979)).
370. Rubin, Law and Legislation, supra note 265, at 410.
371. Id.
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appear irrelevant to the public’s interest. Professors Farber and
372
Frickey question some of these conclusions, including whether
the influence of special interests demands heightened judicial
scrutiny of legislation. They also question legal scholars’ claims of
373
mistrust of legislatures.
Rather, they suggest that “judicial
sensitivity to . . . factors that . . . skew political outcomes is a more
effective means of promoting legislative deliberation than is stricter
374
scrutiny of . . . statutes.” Nonetheless, even they allow for judicial
involvement, positing that “the more sophisticated recent literature
[in Public Choice Theory] . . . suggests that the flaws in the
legislative process are sufficiently serious to warrant cautious
375
judicial intervention.”
Contemporary theorists, including Martha Minnow, Richard
Posner, William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Cass Sunstein,
referring to themselves as “pragmatics,” see the law involving “a
balance between form and substance, tradition and innovation, text
376
and context.” These scholars are pessimistic that legislative issues
377
will be solved by “heightened judicial review,” “although courts
are appropriately concerned about the role of special interests in
the political process, judges ordinarily will be unable to
identify . . . instances in which that process has malfunctioned
378
because of undue influence by special interests.”
The scholars whose work is summarized here would be
troubled by the birth of Section 203. Fuller would likely have
criticized the undemocratic way in which it was drafted and
enacted. Cohen would have courts scrutinize the legislative conduct
for rationality, and Professor Tribe and Justice Linde would agree,
379
raising due process objections. It is likely that CLS scholars would
support judicial scrutiny while questioning its impact, given their
372. Farber & Frickey, supra note 319, at 874.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 912.
375. Id. at 875.
376. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 599.
377. Farber & Frickey, supra note 319, at 908.
378. Id. at 911–12; see also id. at 899–900, 925 (discussing small group influence
on legislators, concluding that while “ideology may play at least as great a role in
the political process as economics” and the “fear [that statutes are nothing more
than deals between contending interest groups] is exaggerated “special interest
groups undoubtedly wield too much collective influence in the legislative
process”).
379. For analysis of due process, see infra Section IV.B.2.
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cynicism about judicial objectivity. They are revealed, through
380
details described earlier, to have been correct about the powered
interests “working” Congress—legislators spoke out, finally, not to
protect citizen researchers, but to protect insurance companies and
381
bureaucrats.
b.

Due Process and the Legislative Process

Due Process in Legislating, a theory articulated by Justice
Linde in 1976, postulates that the Due Process Clauses “instruct
government itself to act” through an appropriate process, and “not
382
simply to legislate subject to later judicial second-guessing.”
383
Others agree.
Linde suggested that a legislative process imbued with due
process would ensure that at least one committee explained to the
384
full body the “factual and value premises” of proposed legislation.
Further, legislators would “explicitly lay out in the . . . record the
385
path they have followed in enacting legislation.” This record
would likely diminish the public’s skepticism, “minimize enactment
of baseless legislation, and allow courts to exercise meaningful
judicial review without . . . being perceived to overstep . . . the
386
proper judicial role in our democratic society.” Julius Cohen
apparently agreed, indicating, “if there is a crying need for

380. See supra Section III.B.1.
381. See supra Section III.B.1.
382. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 381 (referencing Hans A. Linde, Due
Process of Lawyering, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222 (1976)). “Due process of legislating”
should be distinguished from requiring legislation to be the product of
deliberation. The question is whether the legislators considered the evidence and
made findings supported by it. See Martinez, supra note 17, at 551 n.8 (citing Cass
R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985)).
383. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 595; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17-2 to 17-3 (2d ed. 1988) (examining Court
review of the legislature); Farber & Frickey, supra note 319, at 920–25 (postulating
that structural legislative review would reduce the power of interest groups);
Martinez, supra note 17, at 573 (citing Julius Cohen, Towards Realism in
Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950)) (reasoning that the rationality of judicial
decision making can be evaluated; therefore, the rationality of legislative decision
making can be too).
384. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 381 (citing Linde, supra note 382, at
223–24).
385. Martinez, supra note 17, at 575.
386. Id. at 576.
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‘realism’ in the [judicial] area, there is more than sufficient
387
evidence of such need in the [legislative].”
This approach was reflected in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
which challenged a civil service rule barring non-citizens from
employment; based on principles of rational legislating, it was
388
stricken as violating due process. “In a variety of contexts, the
Supreme Court has begun to give greater consideration to matters
389
of lawmaking structure and process:” the process of “the great
debates and compromises that produced the Constitution . . .”
required that “the power to enact statutes ‘may only be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
390
procedure.’” Even the requirement of bicameralism proposed by
James Madison in Federalist No. 51 “ensures that factious and partial
391
laws would not be adopted.” While the Court has occasionally
refused to intercede when a particular bill-creation process was
392
393
ignored, it has, at other times, done precisely that.
Legislation in accordance with these views would likely have
resulted in a revised Section 203, had it been enacted at all. As
adherence to due process principles requires fact-based support,
informed legislators would have realized that the provision would
not substantially further their stated goals. Moreover, if even one
relevant committee had functioned as the rules anticipated, the
legislative record would have reflected “the path [it] . . . followed in
394
enacting [the] legislation.”
Had the electorate witnessed
Congress following its own prescribed process regarding Section
203 and provisions like it, some of their mistrust of Congress could
have been allayed.

387. Cohen, supra note 383, at 888.
388. 426 U.S. 88, 115–17 (1976).
389. Farber & Frickey, supra note 319, at 915.
390. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 285, at 383 (citing Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998)). This procedure, enacted by Congress, should
be followed.
391. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)).
392. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 696–97 (1892) (refusing
to strike a bill although the “enrolled bill” requirement was unmet).
393. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 11 (1892) (reviewing whether the
necessary quorum was established when a bill was passed, and concluding that it in
fact was, and that; therefore, the bill was binding law).
394. Martinez, supra note 17, at 575.
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Cases support the recommendation that legislative decisions
395
“reflect . . . true deliberation.” Take a 1980 dissenting opinion
written by Justice Stevens, who advanced the significance of this
notion. The case, Fullilove v. Klutznick, involved a failed challenge to
a federal statutory requirement that a grantee of federal funds for
local public works projects expend at least ten percent of the grant
396
on purchases from minority owned businesses. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens noted the failure of Congress to explain its goals.
He also pinpointed the absence of either testimony or inquiry vital
to the legislation, during either the legislative hearings or floor
debate, highlighting that “Congress for the first time . . . has
created a broad legislative classification for entitlement . . . based
solely on racial characteristics” and identifying “a dramatic
difference between this Act and . . . thousands of statutes that
397
preceded it.” He noted that:
This dramatic point of departure is not even mentioned
in the statement of purpose of the Act or in the Reports of
either the House or the Senate Committee that processed
the legislation, and was not the subject of any testimony or
inquiry in any legislative hearing on the bill . . . . [T]here
was a brief discussion on the floor of the House as well as
in the Senate . . . but only a handful of legislators spoke
398
and there was virtually no debate.
Justice Stevens also appreciated the constitutional implications
of disregarding legislative procedures:
If the [] language of the Due Process Clause . . .
authorizes this Court to review Acts of Congress under the
standards of the Equal Protection Clause . . . there can be
no separation-of-powers objection to a . . . holding of
unconstitutionality based on a failure to follow
procedures that guarantee the kind of deliberation that a
399
fundamental constitutional issue . . . merits.
He concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because
“[i]t cannot fairly be characterized as a ‘narrowly tailored’ racial
classification because it . . . raises too many . . . questions that
Congress failed to answer or even to address in a responsible

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Farber & Frickey, supra note 319, at 917.
448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980).
Id. at 549–50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 551–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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400

way.” Justice Stevens’ rationale remains prescient today; Section
203, like the statute at issue in Fullilove, resulted from negligible
401
deliberation. Similarly, Section 203 obscures the legislature’s
explanation of purpose, as both testimony and inquiry about the
law’s rationale were lacking. Moreover, the colloquies preceding
the enactment highlight members’ confusion about the law’s
402
drafting process and intention.
Finally, while hearings were
conducted concerning perceived DMF abuses prior to Section
203’s conception, public participation in that process, beyond
403
written submissions, was limited. Regarding Section 203, there
404
were neither legislative hearings nor meaningful floor debate.
c.

Theories of Legislating Support the Foregoing Suggestions

Applying these legislative theories to the enactment of Section
203 and other appropriations, riders would likely produce both
more effective legislation and increased confidence in government.
While some theories, including CLS and Public Choice,
suggest that attempts to affect the status quo will be fruitless, as they
405
presuppose that legislators’ views are fully formed, not all agree
406
Some are more optimistic,
with this deterministic view.
407
particularly concerning statutory interpretation, whose purpose,
according to Professor Sunstein, “is to promote . . . deliberation in
408
the lawmaking process . . .” achieved through a reading of
409
legislative history.
Professor Bell’s emphasis on statutory
interpretation would encourage legislators to “explain statutes and
410
avoid misleading the public,” and to elucidate the rationale
400. Id. at 552 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
401. Id.
402. See supra Section III.B.1.
403. See supra Part III.
404. See supra Part III.
405. Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 39–40 (1999)
(citation omitted).
406. Id. at 40 (citation omitted) (noting that others posit “that participation in
the legislative process does affect the preferences of individual legislators . . . .”).
407. Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative
Process: Can it Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era? 13 J.L. & POL. 105 (1997).
408. Id. at 115 n.55 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539, 1581–82 (1988)).
409. Bell, Legislative History, supra note 405, at 3.
410. Id. at 4. While theories of legislating need to have been noted, a detailed
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behind statutory language.
Had legislators considering DMF
changes evidenced deliberation and explained their rationale and
the provision’s intended impact, the democratic process would
have been safeguarded.
Finally, a rationality requirement could foster valuable
legislative improvements, even lacking a constitutional mandate of
legislative deliberation. Such a requirement would uphold new laws
only when supported by explicit connections between legislative
purpose and constitutional rationale. In United States v. Lopez,
Congress’s failure to make such findings doomed the legislation,
when the Court struck the Gun-Free School Zones Act, finding that
it exceeded Congress’ power to legislate concerning interstate
412
commerce. Presumably, the legislation would have survived had
these connections been identified.
While a subsequent case challenged the notion that statutes
would survive if a nexus was demonstrated between the target of
legislation and the Constitution, that situation differs from the one
involving Section 203. In United States v. Morrison, the Court struck
the Violence Against Women Act as violating the Commerce
Clause, although it was supported by exhaustive references to the
413
impact of this violence on interstate commerce; congressional
findings, the Court said, were insufficient to sustain federal control
where, as here, the “effect[s] on interstate commerce [were]
414
attenuated.”
While Morrison casts doubt on the degree of
415
legislative deliberation sufficient to dispute a challenge, it should
have little effect on an analysis of Section 203, which arose from a
paucity of evidence of deliberation.
C.

Equitable Estoppel Principles Can Forestall Threats to Core Democratic
Principles

Congressional actions that undermine both the public’s trust
and due process can be challenged by claims sounding in equity.
Equitable estoppel, a common law doctrine, prevents one party
analysis is beyond the scope of this piece.
411. Id. at 6, 97; see also id. at 10 (“Madison argued in the Federalist Papers
that popular sovereignty was the essence of republicanism . . . government . . .
derives . . . its powers directly or indirectly from the . . . people . . . .”).
412. 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
413. 529 U.S. 598, 602, 615 (2000).
414. Id. at 612.
415. This question could be the topic of an entire study.
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from taking unfair advantage of another when, through false
language or conduct, one party induces the other to act in a certain
416
way, causing injury. While successfully invoked between private
litigants, courts have been reluctant to apply equitable estoppel to
417
418
with denials
based on deference to
governmental action,
separation of powers principles or reasoning that the government
was safeguarding public funds, protecting sovereign immunity, or
419
avoiding fraudulent schemes.
This resistance to employing
equitable remedies has eased somewhat in recent years, with courts
acknowledging that an estoppel is sometimes warranted to avoid
420
injustice.
The Supreme Court has rarely addressed the suitability of
governmental equitable estoppel; in at least four cases, it ruled
421
against it. In Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, farmers sued
when they were denied crop insurance because they had re-seeded
422
their farmland in violation of a known regulation, but only after a
local federal agent had reassured them that their crops were
423
insurable, despite their actions. The Court denied relief; while
the farmers relied on the agent’s representation to their detriment,
and while a claim against a private insurer would have prevailed,
424
the government was deemed not “just another private litigant.”
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the farmers had constructive
425
notice that their policy had been invalidated.
Decades later, in 1981, the Court examined the issue in a case
that again involved incorrect advice from a government agent. In
Schweiker v. Hansen, the Court did affirm a general rule that the
government could be estopped when engaging in “affirmative
426
misconduct,” but failed to elaborate on what that would look
416. See Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
417. Stephen Holstrom, Contract Law—Estopping Big Brother: The Constitution,
Too, Has Square Corners, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 163, 164 (2011).
418. Id. at 164.
419. Id. at 164–65.
420. Id. at 165.
421. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990); Heckler v.
Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51 (1984); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785
(1981); Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
422. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 382.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 383, 385.
425. Id. at 383–86.
426. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 788–89 .

9. Scharf (791-863) (Do Not Delete)

5/2/2016 9:52 PM

858

[Vol. 42:791

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW
427

like. Here, the incorrect information came from a SSA field
agent, mistakenly telling a recent widow that she was ineligible for
428
certain benefits, which caused her to fail to apply for them. The
instruction manual had instructed agents to suggest that potential
429
applicants fill out an application even if they may be ineligible.
When the plaintiff later learned of her eligibility, she sued, but lost
because, according to the Court, the agent’s failure to instruct her
accurately fell “far short” of action justifying governmental
430
estoppel.
Two years later, the Court reexamined equitable estoppel in
Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., again
denying relief when an agent mistakenly informed a healthcare
431
provider that certain expenditures of federal funds were proper.
Although the Court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to establish
432
the elements of estoppel, it did recognize that the government
could be estopped; unfortunately, it again failed to specify
433
situations in which it would be justified.
Finally, in Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, the Court
enunciated a bright-line rule denying governmental estoppel in
434
cases involving monetary claims, unless authorized by legislation.
Here, a government employee, collecting disability payments,
accepted overtime work only after being told erroneously that it
435
would not affect his disability payments. The employee sued
when he lost his benefits for that precise reason. Again, the Court
refused to estop the government, reasoning that ordering it to pay
would violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution, as it
436
would constitute a distribution of non-appropriated funds. Yet
again, while allowing for the possibility of estoppel, the Court failed
437
to specify the conditions under which it would be warranted.
427. See id.
428. Id. at 786.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 789–90.
431. 467 U.S. 51, 52–53 (1984).
432. Id. at 62–63.
433. Id. at 60–61.
434. 496 U.S. 414, 426 (1990) (“[J]udicial use of the equitable doctrine of
estoppel cannot grant respondent a money remedy that Congress has not
authorized.”).
435. Id. at 417–18.
436. Id. at 425–26.
437. Id. at 423 (“[I]t remains true that we need not embrace a rule that no
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Scholars have offered suggestions to address the shortcomings
438
in these rulings, which do establish that government estoppel can
succeed in cases involving both affirmative misconduct and proof
439
that payments will not derive from non-appropriated funds. First,
it is suggested that estoppel applies when the government acts
440
proprietarily. This is irrelevant to the Section 203 situation, as the
government is not acting proprietarily.
Second, two forms of estoppel can be identified: substantive
441
and procedural.
Substantive estoppel is invoked when one
442
demands a benefit to which one is not entitled, such as a claim
443
owed because of a government agent’s misstatement. It is unlikely
that Section 203 would be subject to a substantive estoppel claim.
Procedural estoppel, on the other hand, could be invoked in a case
like the one at hand. It applies when the government fails to follow
444
its own rules, causing harm.
The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Hansen v. Harris, allowed for this remedy, which was
held to be sustainable by a violation of either a procedural
requirement or “an internal procedural manual or guide or some
other source of objective standards of conduct,” supporting “an
445
inference of misconduct by a Government employee.”
The Supreme Court rejected this broad interpretation in
Schweiker, holding that procedural shortfalls, such as a government
agent failing to follow a claims manual and neglecting to
recommend that an applicant file a written application, were
insufficient to invoke estoppel when the government refused

estoppel will lie against the Government in any case in order to decide this case.
We leave for another day whether an estoppel claim could ever succeed against
the Government.”).
438. Holstrom, supra note 417, at 178.
439. Id. at 173–74 (noting that courts are concerned that “[E]stoppel would
violate the Appropriations Clause, since it would be tantamount to the court
forcing the government to pay funds that Congress never appropriated . . . .”).
440. Id. at 178–79.
441. Id. at 179.
442. Id.
443. See Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (notwithstanding
that insured knew nothing of regulation, had informed authorities of intention to
reseed, and was incorrectly advised that crop was insurable, was barred recovery on
insurance claim for lost crop because federal regulations precluded coverage).
444. Holstrom, supra note 417, at 179–80.
445. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 949 (2d Cir. 1980).
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benefits because the applicant failed to file the required written
446
application.
Appellate courts have followed Schweiker’s affirmative
misconduct mandate. The Fifth Circuit, for example, requires
“more than mere negligence, delay, inaction, or failure to follow an
447
internal agency guideline.” This standard could be met in the
Section 203 case, as Congress intentionally, not negligently,
breached its own rules, violating procedure in a substantial
manner.
The elements of an equitable estoppel claim challenging a
congressional act include:
(1) Affirmative misconduct by members of Congress in the
448
passage of legislation;
(a) Basic estoppel elements
(b) False representation;
(c) Intent to induce claimants to act on the
misrepresentation;
(d) Ignorance/inability of claimant to learn the truth;
449
(e) Detrimental reliance on the misrepresentation;
and
450
(2) That failure to estop will result in a serious injustice.
Challenging Section 203 based on equitable estoppel has
considerable merit. The pre-enactment colloquies in Congress
alone attest to the significant violations of internal rules
accompanying the enactment. Affirmative misconduct, on the
other hand, could prove a more difficult hurdle to overcome.
Generally defined as an “affirmative act of misrepresentation or
451
concealment of a material fact,” with misrepresentation requiring
“making a false or misleading assertion . . . , usually with the intent

446. Schweiker, 450 U.S. 789–90.
447. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 976 F.2d 934, 938 (5th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1265 (5th Cir.1987)).
448. Bartlett v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 716 F.3d 464, 475 (8th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 739 (8th
Cir. 2005)) (“To succeed on a claim of equitable estoppel against the government,
a plaintiff must prove not only all the elements of equitable estoppel, but also that
the government committed affirmative misconduct.”).
449. Story v. Marsh, 732 F.2d 1375, 1383 (8th Cir. 1984).
450. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1989).
451. Misconduct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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452

to deceive;” an estoppel claim requires more than innocent or
453
negligent misrepresentation.
Members of Congress committed affirmative misconduct when
they misrepresented material facts concerning the DMF. The claim
that Section 203 was intended to combat fraudulent tax returns was
false and misleading, satisfying the first element of traditional
estoppel; at best, Section 203 will save minimal funds over the next
decade, relative to a problem costing tens of billions during that
454
time.
Noteworthy, yet distressing, is the fact that the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost estimate exposes
legislators’ awareness of the insignificant financial consequence of
Section 203.
Finally, the government’s intent to induce the public to act on
its misrepresentations is evidenced by Section 203’s requirement
that researchers apply for certification in order to access recent
DMF data. The CBO cost estimates of Section 203 saving $269
million over the next decade establish that Congress calculated that
the public would participate in this certification process, projected
455
to bring in $517 million over that time.
Further, the
government’s ongoing withholding of information about claims of
456
DMF abuse is harming the public, which has detrimentally relied
on the government’s misrepresentations and which faces an
expensive certification process for an inferior product. Those who
are denied access to recent DMF data because they have not
applied for certification, likely because of statutory ineligibility, are
harmed as well.
Given the egregious nature of the injustices resulting from
Section 203’s enactment, estoppel should be employed here. The
intent of Congress vis-à-vis Section 203 was not to address tax
457
refund fraud, but to use budget ruses to deceive. Congress
458
needed Section 203 to help balance the budget. It is implausible
that legislators believed Section 203 would do much to combat
fraudulent tax returns, a multi-billion-dollar problem, by

452. Misrepresentation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
453. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981); see also supra text
accompanying note 423.
454. See supra Part III.
455. See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text.
456. See supra note 64.
457. See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
458. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (describing estimated savings).
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implementing this provision, which will save little. The numbers
do suggest, though, that the DMF presented a simple way to claim
savings while justifying excessive certification fees.
Failure to estop Section 203 and similar appropriation riders
interferes with the executive department’s constitutional authority
460
to veto legislation. Appropriations riders similar to Section 203
are often included in appropriation bills posing the specter of
461
government shutdown; one had just occurred in October 2013.
Inserting a provision like Section 203 undermined the President’s
ability to veto the full bill if he found this or other riders
objectionable, given the dramatic results of an unfunded
government. As the Presentment Clause guards against “ill462
conceived legislation,” putting the President’s ‘back against the
wall’ in this way exceeds ordinary politics—it threatens our finelytuned system, as it creates a dramatic power shift from the
executive to the legislature, making “a mockery of the President’s
ability to exercise the veto power,” and corrupting “the delicate
463
structure of shared powers.”
V. CONCLUSION
464

Edward Lorenz, when coining the phrase “butterfly effect,”
surely was not thinking of consequences like the ones examined in
this paper. Nonetheless, this exploration has revealed the
unintended consequences of substantive appropriations riders, and

459. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
460. See Fitzgerald, supra note 267, at 396; see also Zellmer, supra note 257,
at 527.
461. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing government shutdown).
462. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 418–19 (1998); U.S. CONST. art.
I. § 7, cl. 2, 3.
463. Zellmer, supra note 275, at 527. Had space allowed, this paper would
conclude with a discussion of principles of “best practices in legislating,” to be
used to enhance the legislative process, at least at the federal level. Such principles
could be fostered through a number of measures, some of which have been
touched upon: from securing commitments to engage in procedural regularity
(“following the rules”), to employing a legislative transparency process, to
fostering input from constituents and stakeholders, to reconsidering a renewed
presidential line-item veto.
464. Larry Bradley, The Butterfly Effect, CHAOS & FRACTALS, http://www.stsci
.edu/~lbradley/seminar/butterfly.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).
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has offered a host of options for addressing this challenging state of
affairs.

